Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1

Article 3

Liability for Trademark Infringement for Internet
Service Providers
Katja Weckström
University of Turku, Finland

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
Repository Citation
Katja Weckström, Liability for Trademark Infringement for Internet Service Providers, 16 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 1 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/iplr/vol16/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

ARTICLES

LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT FOR INTERNET SERVICE
PROVIDERS
KATJA WECKSTRÖM*

*

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 2
II. ISPS IN ACTION......................................................................................... 10
A. ISPs in the Market Context .......................................................... 10
B. Online Auction Sites: eBay .......................................................... 11
C. Search Engines: Google ................................................................ 14
III. LEGISLATIVE BASIS ............................................................................... 16
A. The E-Commerce Directive ......................................................... 16
B. European Trademark Law ........................................................... 22
1. Harmonization in Practice: Trademark-Specific
Legislation ............................................................................. 22
2. Harmonization in Practice: General Rules That Apply
to Trademarks ....................................................................... 26
C. Summary ........................................................................................ 28
IV. THE CONFLICT IN PRACTICE: THREE APPROACHES ......................... 30
A. Property Rules and Contributory Infringement ........................ 30
B. Liability Rules: Duty to Act ........................................................ 32
C. Liability Rules and Safe Harbors................................................ 35
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS ................................................................... 36
∗ Dr. in Spe, LL.M in Int’l and Comp. Law, University Lecturer at the Faculty of Law
at the University of Turku, Finland. The author would like to thank Ryan Wiesner and the
editors of Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review for excellent editorial work and the
participants of the Second Conference on Innovation and Communications Law on August
13-14, 2009, at the University of Louisville Law School, KY, U.S.A., the Seminar on
Intellectual Property and Global Justice on August 18-19, 2009, at the University of
Hokkaido Law School in Japan, and the Nordic Network Meeting on April 15-16, 2010 in
Helsinki, Finland for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Any errors or omissions are
attributable to the author. For comments and questions please email katja.weckstrom@utu.fi.

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

[Vol. 16:1

A. Liability for ISPs........................................................................... 36
1. Intellectual Property Rights and Trademark
Protection .............................................................................. 36
2. Protecting Trademarks With Property or Liability
Rules ....................................................................................... 41
3. Protecting ISPs With Property or Liability Rules .............. 44
B. Pooling Resources and Enhancing Cooperation ...................... 46
VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 49
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of the internet made two things apparent: (1) borderless,
wireless, and classless communication challenges traditional societal and
legislative structures; and (2) the advantages of the internet also benefit
criminal actors and organized crime, and disproportionally so when
1
legislation lags behind.
It is commonly known that members of
organized crime groups use both technological hijacking of personal
computers as well as ISPs to further their own goals. ISPs may serve as
mere [technological] conduits of data, but nonetheless allow illegal
activity. In addition, ISPs may also serve as hosts of illegal material or
allow illegal transactions on their sites. Unlike in the case of copyright
piracy, there are no sites or ISPs that trade exclusively in counterfeit
goods. Instead, fake goods are mixed with legitimate trade in the
primary or secondary markets.
Illegitimate trade, by which trademarks are exploited, are commonly
referred to as trademark piracy and trademark counterfeiting. The
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO, defines trademark
piracy as “the registration or use of a generally well-known foreign
trademark that is not registered in the country or is invalid as a result of
2
non-use.” Trademark piracy targets the trademark itself and hijacks

1.
A
serious
problem
for
everyone,
EUROPEAN
COMM’N.,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/combating
/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011); Statistics of customs detentions recorded at the
COMM’N.,
external
borders
of
the
EU,
EUROPEAN
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statistics/i
ndex_en.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (highlighting statistics of customs’ actions to enforce
intellectual property rights at the EU’s external border from 2000-2008); ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
COUNTERFEITING (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf.
2.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, PUB. NO. 489 § 2.493, available at
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/. For the sake of comparison, copyright piracy is “the
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the trademark’s value in order to sell the pirate’s own products. Article
6bis of the Paris Convention offers a remedy for holders of globally
well-known marks who are victims of trademark piracy and allows them
to prevent registration and use of identical or similar marks for identical
or similar products, despite the mark not being used or registered in the
4
country in question.
Counterfeiting, a second form of illegitimate trade, can be defined as
“the unlawful forgery, copying, or imitation of an item, . . . or the
unauthorized possession of such an item, with the intent to deceive or
5
defraud by claiming or passing the item as genuine.” While trademark
counterfeiting often involves copying of the trademark itself, the
primary object of copying is the product that is sold under a particular
6
brand. An element of deceit is present because the goal of the
counterfeiter is to tap into the market of the brand and, to some extent,
7
pass off the fakes as the real merchandise.
Unlike traditional
trademark infringement and trademark dilution, which are sanctioned
by civil remedies, trademark counterfeiting and piracy are universally
8
criminally sanctioned.
For purposes of discussion in this article,
reference to illegitimate trade refers solely to instances of trademark
counterfeiting.
Illegal trade such as the buying, selling, soliciting, or trading in

unauthorized copying of copyright materials for commercial purposes and the unauthorized
commercial dealing in copied materials.” Id. at § 2.232. Copyright, which is based on the
exclusive right of authorization, is thus completely hijacked.
3. It could be argued that keyword advertising fits the theoretical definition of
trademark piracy, since the trademark in one sense is hijacked. Trademark piracy is,
however, narrowly tailored and understood as an exception that is closely tied to the specific
remedy in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. Treaty provisions cannot be interpreted
expansively under customary norms of international law. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1949, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
4. Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6bis, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (last revision entered into force
on 15 December 1972.); see also Roshana Kelbrick, The Term Well-Known in South African
Trade-mark Legislation: Some Comparative Interpretations, 38 CILSA 435, 436 (2005).
Trademark piracy should not be confused with the extended protection granted to owners of
famous marks against trademark dilution or tarnishment. While the former applies to
trademarks that are not used in the territory in question, the latter requires registration or use
in the country in which protection is sought.
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 376 (8th ed. 2004).
6. WIPO, supra note 2, § 2.496.
7. Id.
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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material depicting child pornography is relatively easy to deal with in
legislative terms, although enforcement in practice remains difficult.
Infringement of trademark rights presents a more difficult legal
conundrum because the sale of counterfeit goods is criminalized, but
buying counterfeit goods may not be. Furthermore, when we approach
the question from the perspective of trademark law, the object of
9
protection is not the good itself, but the label under which it is sold.
This is also true in cases of trademark counterfeiting because trademark
law does not protect the good itself. Therefore, legitimate trade under
the same trademark is, technically speaking, identical to illegitimate
trade because it stems from protection of a typed word-mark. Although
modern trademark law recognizes several types of marks in the context
of the internet, our focus is directed at word marks and the scope of
exclusivity.
10
In the world of 1s and 0s, established legal concepts have a whole
new meaning; in practice, legal concepts in the context of the internet
may mean nothing at all, or at least not what they mean in the real
11
market. While somewhat useful in distinguishing other than protected
uses from real market commerce, these artificial constructs become
increasingly burdensome in the virtual context when attempting to force
12
new uses into set molds. Thus, we run the risk of addressing the issue
9. The incentive theory that underlies French trademark law would argue that the
branding of luxury goods is a protected creative effort, much like that underlying copyrighted
works. Elsewhere, trademark law is generally not considered as strongly grounded in
incentive theory as patents and copyrights. See, e.g., WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11 (2003);
Annette Kur, Fundamental Concerns in the Harmonization of (European) Trademark Law,
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 151,
(Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, eds., 2008); On incentives and the fashion industry in
Italy as compared to France, see, e.g., J.H. Reichman, Preface to Intellectual Property and
Competition Law, GUSTAVO GHIDINI, INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
WELFARE IN IP LAW, XV, 1, 4, 10 (Edward Elgar, 2010).
10. Established legal concepts include trademark use, nominative use, confusing
similarity, and even willful trademark infringement.
11. Efforts have been made to categorize uses on the internet according to these
theoretical concepts. When applied to the acts of intermediaries, courts on both sides of the
Atlantic, however, seem unwilling to adopt these concepts into trademark law. See, e.g.,
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03, 113 (2d Cir. 2010); joined cases C-236/08 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08),
Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08), and Centre National de Recherché en Relations
Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. I-02417 [hereinafter Google AdWords
Case].
12. On the difference between real market uses of trademarks and uses on the internet
see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use,
92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669, 1672 (2007). The European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ) and some

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

ISP LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

5

of third party liability squarely as a question of direct infringement
13
without considering the secondary nature of the tort. In a time when
the text of a directive from the year 2000 is outdated, efforts still seem
focused on defining in technological detail what constitutes and what
does not constitute infringement. At the same time, we know that
organized crime adapts faster than restrictive measures are imposed.
Still, questions of liability are decided in this framework using
definitional bridges such as “neutrality,” “actual knowledge,” and
14
“technical capacity.”
15
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) extends the
discussion on legislative safe harbors and liability of internet
intermediaries to infringements in trademark law. However, much of
the discussion still seems to center on copyright infringement, while
issues peculiar to trademark law seem to be given less, if any, in-depth
scrutiny. Thus, if the activities of ISPs are opened to scrutiny under the
respective trademark laws in place, the balancing outcomes from the
copyright setting should not be applied without scrutiny to ISP liability,
16
but should first be recalibrated to trademark law. This is especially
American courts show their unease with the theoretical concepts of nominative or trademark
use by simply refusing to adopt these doctrines. However, lacking better alternatives,
trademark practitioners, and academics routinely refer to these constructs as tools in
delimiting trademark law, as evidenced, for example, by the questions presented to the EUCJ
for a preliminary ruling. Whether used by courts, practitioners, or academics, there seems to
be no single understanding of a concept in trademark law, but several narrow, case-specific
understandings, depending on the jurisdiction, position, and background of the speaker.
Generalization is thus difficult, and even when there seems to be common understanding on
outcome or effect, the concept remains tied to its national context and theoretical framework.
Even with the best of efforts, there exists uncertainty on how trademark law theory should
deal with uses of trademarks on the internet. At present, there is a sizable gap between
trademark law on the books and trademark law in practice, and the two seem to be speaking
different languages. If the law as set forth by the EUCJ is not understandable to national
judges, since it refuses to adopt or reject concepts, how are they to interpret EU trademark
law, balance competing interests, and decide cases brought before them?; see Kur, supra note
9, at 155.
13. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1670.
14. See infra Part IV; infra Part III(A)(2) (discussing the Google Adwords Case).
15. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), THE EUROPEAN COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/anticounterfeiting/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
16. While the EU officially states that its position when negotiating ACTA is that
there will be no substantive change in EU intellectual property laws, the Commission admits
that it bases its position on that of the Corrigendum to Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L
195) [hereinafter Enforcement Directive] (correcting Directive 2004/48/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 29, 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights). The protection available under the Enforcement Directive constitutes a higher level
of protection than Member States have clearly adopted and thus presupposes a certain level
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important since trademark laws tend not to distinguish between direct
and indirect infringers, nor do the laws cap the use of all available
17
remedies.
Another recent attempt at navigating this unmapped legal landscape
was made by the EUCJ, as well as Advocate General (AG) PoiaresMaduro, in three joined cases concerning Google’s Adwords service and
18
keyword advertising in general. The ruling answered broad questions
such as whether trademark law can apply at all to the activities of ISPs.
19
It opened the possibility of a broad reading of outdated technological
20
language in the E-Commerce Directive to include Google’s activities.
However, it could be interpreted to open the safe harbor in practice,
since the ruling hinges on the concept of ‘actual knowledge,’ which is
not defined in either the directive or in practice.
In practice, Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, which includes
a prohibition against imposing a general duty on ISPs to monitor
infringing activity on their sites, had been interpreted to require bona
fide cooperation, e.g., with a notice-and-take down procedure, but
21
nothing more. While actual knowledge remains undefined in practical
of protection under substantive law. The Enforcement Directive clearly states that it should
not apply to the question of ISP liability, since the provisions of the Directive 2000/31/EEC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J.
(L 178) [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive] should prevail there; see also Press Release,
European Comm’n, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement: European Commission welcomes
release
of
negotiation
documents,
(April
21,
2010)
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552&serie=337&langId=en.
Nevertheless, the negotiating text of ACTA includes a section regulating safe harbors for
ISPs. EUROPEAN COMM’N, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, INFORMAL
PREDECISIONAL/DELIBARATIVE
DRAFT,
(Oct.
2,
2010),
available
at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/october/tradoc_146699.pdf.
17.
First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, of the European Communities of 21
December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks,
89/104/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1–7 [hereinafter Trademark Directive].
18. See Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R.
I-02417.
19. The definitions adopted in the E-Commerce Directive are based on directives for
technical standards. For example, Article 2(a) defines ”information society services”
according to Article 1(2) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of July 20, 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC Laying Down a Procedure for the
Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 98/34/EC, 1998
O.J. (L 217), 21. These definitions do not necessarily apply well in the context in which IPSs
operate in the 2010s.
20. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at 1–16.
21. Advocate General’s Opinion, Sept. 9, 2009, Joined Cases C-236/08, Google France
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terms, ISPs will face right holder pressure in court. This is because
contemporary, allegedly infringing ISP activity fits less and less neatly
with the technological definitions underlying the legal provisions in
22
place.
Legislation tailored to solve a general problem is now marginalized
in favor of specific legislation tailored to right holder interests, or no
legislation, with accompanying battles in court. The remedies available
to right holders, which include criminal sanctions or automatic damages
for willful trademark infringement, are a measurement for societal
23
consequences. The effect is enhanced since trademark law today, in
most countries, does not distinguish between indirect and direct
trademark infringement. Courts are left to balance established interests
vested in trademark law against the vague and disproportionate
24
interests of a disorganized group of ISPs. The latter interests are also
constantly changing because technological and other innovation spurs
new business ideas and models on the internet while making others

S.A.R.L.; C-236-08, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletiere, SA; C-237/08, Viaticum SA,
Lucetiel S.A.R.L.; C-238/08, Centre National de Recherché en Relations Humaines
(CNRRH) S.A.R.L., (EUCJ March 23, 2010) at 147-151 [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate
General].
22. See Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R.
I-02417. Likewise, the narrowly defined safe harbors for mere conduit, caching, or hosting
could not have foreseen the uses of trademarks with which courts are today. The EUCJ,
however, broadened the understanding of ”hosting” against such a narrow interpretation in
the Google AdWords Case. Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google
Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08)
and Centre National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08),
2010 E.C.R. I-02417.
23. Enforcement Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 28, art. 13.
24. One could argue that ISPs like Google, eBay, and Yahoo are powerful actors
today and vigorously fight right holder interests (and to some extent also organize others to
fight). Multinational corporations do not necessarily reflect the needs of national enterprises,
startup businesses, and SMEs that cannot afford to establish tools like eBay’s fraud engine, or
openly defy copyright laws in place like the Google Books Project. If requisite knowledge for
failure to act is tailored to the technological capability or resources of these operators in
mind, the standards are well out of reach of most ISPs in the world. For example, the
national equivalent of eBay in Finland is approximately eight years behind eBay in
addressing concerns relating to combating sales of counterfeit goods on line. Note that eBay
does not operate in markets with less than eight-million people, for example Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Norway, Portugal, and Eastern Europe (with the exception of Poland). See
Who We Are, EBAY INC., http://www.ebayinc.com/who (last visited Nov. 5, 2011). Solving a
practical problem that arises due to the fast-paced development of multinationals on the
international level does not necessarily provide for any scrutiny of competing interests on a
more level national playing field.
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obsolete. The question becomes one of priority. Legislation that allows
innovation that spurs ISPs to supply where there is demand, or
25
legislation that allows right holders en groupe to curtail innovation by a
multitude of disproportionate threats of damages. This article suggests
that we put the carriage back behind the horse and allow the horse to
pull the carriage into the unknown.
More specifically, this article makes three suggestions. First, it is
vital to prioritize in light not of current economic value and actors, but
in light of preserving and stimulating continued economic growth,
recognizing that growth may take place in new fields, and thus shift
economic power in society. Without diminishing the importance of the
legitimate interests of holders of intellectual property rights in, for
example, combating counterfeiting and piracy, the recent technological
breakthroughs should be allowed to reach their potential, and the
overall social benefit of the activity of an internet service provider
should weigh heavily against curtailment. Ex post facto legislation
should therefore be preferred over ex ante legislation. This means that
ISPs should presumptively enjoy protection against individual lawsuits
that suggest liability because harmful conduct occurs on the internet,
not because the ISP itself has acted inappropriately.
Second, substantive trademark law should develop new tools to
define trademark infringement on the internet. There are two sides to
this argument. On the one hand, the virtual market differs from the real
world market, and trademarks are utilized differently, blurring the line
between commercial and noncommercial use. The issue is what in the
trademark is at the heart of protection; is it its distinguishing capacity in
relation to competing goods or services, or its ability to invoke
consumer recollection and consequently, its asset value? Consequently,
when is the technologically speaking identical act of reproducing the
trademark allowed, and when is it not? On the other hand, absolute
protection of ISPs is equally harmful to society as is too strong a
protection of trademark owners’ interests. Thus, allowing recourse
against ISPs that predominantly trade in illegal goods, profit from
infringement, or openly defy current intellectual property laws is vital.
Although clear cases of abuse are being redressed successfully in court
today, the gray area is growing. It should be noted that the clearly
26
abusive cases concern copyright piracy.
25. Right holders act individually to optimize their gain but target the same ISP, thus
having an aggregated and real effect on the ISP and influencing its future behavior.
26. See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
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Due to the weighty and far-reaching interests at stake, courts, at
least in Europe, are not suited to decide these cases without specific
27
28
legislative guidelines that balance the societal interests at stake. To
narrow the area of uncertainty, defining “infringement” both in terms of
direct and indirect infringement is necessary. Only after recognizing
indirect infringement as a separate offense with appropriately tailored
remedies can the question of third party liability be resolved.
Substantive trademark law, thus, needs new parameters to define
infringing use on the internet and new tools to distinguish between
direct and indirect infringers. In the meanwhile, society should err on
29
the side of over-protection of ISPs.
Third, instead of allowing direct legal redress, the right holders
should be encouraged to pool their resources in fighting trademark
counterfeiting and infringement on the internet. Nothing under current
law prevents right holders from more efficiently policing their rights. As
the well-known jeweler Tiffany has proven, it is technologically possible
to reach a state of enforcement that is higher than the one reached
30
today, irrespective of the actions of the ISP. Optimal efficiency in
utilizing notice-and-takedown procedures can be reached without
imposing liability on third parties. In addition, overall efficiency is best
reached when the interested parties pool their resources to combat a
31
common threat. Moreover, cooperation with ISPs is already deeply
rooted, and will likely prove even more fruitful when self-protective
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Stockholm
District Court, department 5, Apr. 17, 2009, the so-called Pirate Bay Case.
27. It is argued here that adequate guidelines answer the question of how interests
should be balanced in a new setting. A statement that the court should balance competing
interests taking into account the fundamental interests at stake is not considered, for reasons
discussed in detail, “legislative guidelines.” It is also argued that a statement by the EUCJ
that national courts should consider fundamental interests and perform balancing of
legitimate interests cannot be interpreted to mean that they should presume that legislation in
place (e.g., national trademark laws or the Trademark Directive) already reflects such an
appropriate balance (e.g., Gillette or Google AdWords).
28. MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
xviii (Oxford University Press 1981).
29. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) (providing that
“[w]henever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more people, it must
decide which side to favor. Absent such a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself
will be decided on the basis of ‘might makes right’—whoever is stronger or shrewder will
win.”).
30. Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Tiffany Inc.
v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
31. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1094.
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measures can be removed. Finally, and most importantly, the bulk of
the costs of combating trademark-pirate ingenuity and organized crime,
and consequently, the ultimate risk of non-enforcement, fall on the right
holders, who are thus incentivized to put a larger amount of resources
toward this cause if they deem it necessary. The resources allocated to
the endeavor are likely to be more proportionate to the overall harm of
illegal trade in counterfeit goods than if a third, predominantly
32
disinterested party, is forced to act under threat of liability.
The contemporary activities of some ISPs are described in Part II,
and present and future trademark law trigger-points are highlighted.
Contemporary legislation that applies to the question of whether ISPs
may be held liable for trademark infringement under EU law is
presented in Part III. Part IV describes the approach of three national
courts and sets the approaches in a theoretical context, when tackling
the issue whether and to what extent the on-line auction site eBay is
liable for the sale of counterfeit merchandise on its site. Part V analyzes
the approaches of the national courts and presents proposals for future
action.
II. ISPS IN ACTION
A. ISPs in the Market Context
The purpose of this section is to depict the general activities of ISPs
that may give rise to concerns under trademark law and more
specifically, trigger a lawsuit from a trademark holder for infringement,
33
dilution, or failure to act. The aim is to place the internet service
provider’s legitimate activity in a societal perspective before addressing
32. It could be argued that not all trademark owners can afford to put more resources
toward combating infringement. Counterfeiting affects mostly regionally or globally wellknown brands, such as multinational corporations, rendering the argument for absolute and
limitless protected status unpersuasive. These companies already benefit from notice-andtakedown procedures and comprehensive schemes to combat the sale of counterfeit products
on the internet at the expense of ISPs. Limiting liability of ISPs to what can reasonably be
expected from them in terms of monetary, human, and technological resources allocated to
the endeavor should sufficiently address right holder’s legitimate interests. For the sake of
comparison of the gravity of social interests concerned, ISP liability or duty to act is also not
absolute when it comes to removing material relating to criminal offences such as child
pornography, in fighting terrorism, or protecting national security. E-Commerce Directive,
supra note 16, art. 3.4.
33. The services are depicted based on information provided by the company in
question, such as a description of services provided, the technology used, trademark policies,
and complaint procedures. Press releases or reported news on the size of the business,
transactions, and market volume are also cited.
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trademark concerns. While this article focuses on a line of cases
involving trademark counterfeiting on eBay, this section is intended to
bring forth other trademark law issues that are routinely, even if not yet
addressed in court, triggered in contemporary practice, and thus, will
inevitably be addressed in law in the future. This article argues that the
answer to the question of liability of ISPs should necessarily be
informed by contemporary business practices.
This context is important for three reasons. First, the E-Commerce
Directive, unlike its U.S. counterpart, left the issue of establishing
notice-and-takedown procedures to self-regulation, and allows the
market to develop procedures and change them to adapt with
development. However, in Article 21.2 of the E-Commerce Directive it
was noted that there might be a “need for additional conditions for the
34
exemption from liability . . . in the light of technical developments,”
which precludes the interpretation that the Directive was intended to
35
leave the issue completely unregulated. Second, courts are unduly
restricted in striking a fair balance between the fundamental interests at
stake when ISP activities are only viewed restrictively from the point of
view of trademark infringement. Indeed, the E-Commerce Directive
recognizes that such case-specific, fact-based inquiry may not address
ISP activities and social benefit adequately and would easily amount to
disproportionate burdens on ISPs that consequently thwart
36
technological development of legitimate services and activity. Third,
even if the inquiry was restricted to the activities alleged to constitute
trademark infringement, contemporary market and business practices
should bear on what “a normally informed and reasonably attentive
[consumer]” may assume from the use of the trademark in the internet
37
context.
B. Online Auction Sites: eBay
EBay operates an online auction site at www.ebay.com, which allows
34. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 21.2.
35. See also First Report on the application of Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on
Electronic Commerce), at 65, 71, 75, COM (2003) 702 final (Nov. 21, 2003) [hereinafter First
Commission Report].
36. Id. at 72–73.
37. Advocate General’s Opinion, Dec. 9, 2010, Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA, Lancôme
Parfums et Beauté & Cie, Laboratoire Garnier & Cie L’Oréal (UK) Limited v. eBay
International AG, eBay Europe S.A.R.L., eBay (UK) Limited, at 108 available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009C0324:EN:HTML.

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

12

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

[Vol. 16:1

anyone to register to buy and sell goods to one another. Products are
38
sold at auction, through fixed price or “buy it now” listings. The site
contains 100 million listings at any given time, with a daily contribution
39
of six million listings more. EBay earns an “insertion fee” for each
listing and a “final value fee” based on the final sale price for any sold
item. While eBay does not sell items itself (or have the physical good in
its possession at any time) it connects buyers and sellers and enables
40
secure transactions between them. In addition, eBay also owns and
41
operates PayPal and advertises its services, including availability of
specific listed goods on its site, both on its own site and externally, for
example, through a key word advertising.
Unlike a real world auction house, the entirety of eBay’s service is
technically generated. A search engine that can find specific items
within the database accompanies the auction listings. In addition, eBay
actively develops technical tools to allow for specific sellers and buyers
to more efficiently find each other on the site. The company also
provides seminars and workshops for sellers to help them increase sales
42
43
on eBay; ‘Powersellers’ receive even more assistance and guidance.
Technically speaking, eBay’s advertising is highly automated. For
example, when a potential buyer enters a search term in eBay’s internal
search engine, it may trigger an automated advertisement such as “Find
[brand keyword] items at low prices.” Likewise, eBay runs general ads
like “great brands, great prices” or “Fall Fashion Brand Blowout,”
which links the clicking buyer to listings entailing a reference to branded
products. EBay also guides its buyers to the cheapest deals for any
given product and advises them to take advantage of the high demand
44
of branded merchandise; while eBay does not advertise particular
listings, its advertisements tend to, in effect, promote the sale of
counterfeit products, in its more general effort to improve the volume of
legitimate sales in general, or in a niche market.
According to court record, eBay invests $20,000,000 in United States
dollars (USD) annually in tools to promote trust and safety on its
website, including tools to combat anti-counterfeiting and facilitate
38. Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
39. Id. at 474–75 (citing Def’s Decl. at 9).
40. Id. at 474, 476.
41. Id. at 475; PayPal offers secure payment services, and charges a fee for each
transaction.
42. Id. at 475–76.
43. Id. at 476.
44. Id. 479–81.
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removal of such listings. Roughly 4,000 of eBay’s total workforce of
16,000 employees is devoted to trust and safety, and of a total of 2,000
customer service representatives, more than ten-percent are devoted
46
exclusively to infringement issues.
In addition, seventy people are
employed to cooperate with law enforcement, which includes providing
47
information necessary to arrest counterfeiters.
On the technological side, eBay operates several programs,
commonly termed “eBay’s fraud engine,” to search for fraudulent
listings, and spends in excess of $5,000,000 USD annually to maintain
and enhance these technological tools that automatically search for
listings by employing more than 13,000 search rules and complex
models. EBay developed this technology in 2002 based on the results of
two years of performing manual searches. Together, these programs
flag thousands of listings daily, which customer service representatives
review and remove according to internal guidelines designed to target
48
violations of eBay’s policies.
In addition, eBay maintains a procedure commonly referred to as
the Verified Rights Owner Program (VeRO), which in effect is a notice49
and-takedown system, serving approximately 14,000 right holders. By
filing a Notice of Claimed Infringement (NOCI) via fax, email, or the
online VeRO Reporting Tool, a right holder can report an infringing
listing. The program also provides tools to assist right owners in
searching for infringing listings, including an automated search tool
called “My Favorite Searches” that can repeat favorite searches daily
50
and email the search results to the right holder.
Among thousands of listings reported weekly, each was, according to
eBay’s policy, to be reviewed and removed within twenty-four hours,
and in practice 70–80% of the listings are removed within twelve hours;
bidding on items in infringing listings is suspended and transactions are
51
retroactively cancelled. EBay also refunds all fees, and in some cases
52
reimburses the buyer through its “Buyer Protection Program.” Lastly,
eBay provides an opportunity for right holders to create an “About Me”
page on the eBay web-site designed to inform eBay’s customers about
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 477.
Id.
Id. (referring to the operation of the www.eBay.com site).
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 479.
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their products, intellectual property rights, and legal positions.
Questions of trademark law that are triggered by eBay’s activity
include: (1) is eBay liable for direct trademark infringement for
advertising or promoting the use of brands in consumer searches and
seller advertising, and failing to prevent listings for the sale of
counterfeit goods; (2) is eBay liable for indirect trademark infringement
for facilitating and inducing the sale of counterfeit goods; and (3) is
eBay liable for dilution of a famous mark by allowing and promoting
searches using brands?
C. Search Engines: Google
Google is the world’s largest search engine and the flagship of
Google Inc., operating with a mission “to organize the world’s
54
information and make it universally accessible and useful.”
The
Google search engines operate at www.google.com and 150 other
domains in different countries and languages. In addition, Google
55
56
offers many other services, applications, software, and search
57
features. Google services are mostly free for both private and business
users, and Google finances its services through selling advertising space
58
on its sites. For this purpose, Google operates programs called Google
Adwords and Google AdSense, and supporting tools such as Google
59
Analytics, Website Optimizer, Insights for Search, and AdPlanner.
The services that trigger questions of trademark law are described by
AG Poiares-Maduro as follows:
On entering keywords into [the] search engine, internet users are
presented with a list of natural results. These natural results are
selected and ranked according to their relevance to the
keywords. This is done through the automatic algorithms
underlying the search engine program, which apply purely
objective criteria.
Google also operates an advertisement system called ‘AdWords’,
53. Id.
54.
Google,
Inc.,
Corporate
Information,
GOOGLE,
http://www.google.fi/intl/en/corporate/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
55. Some services are Google Maps, Google Books, and Google News Archive.
56. Some applications are Google Calendar and Google Docs.
57. Some search features are Google Toolbar, Google Chrome, and Personalized
Search.
58. Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 13.
59. Google, Inc., supra note 54.
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which enables ads to be displayed, alongside natural results, in
response to keywords.
Ads typically consist of a short
commercial message and a link to the advertiser’s site; they are
differentiated from natural results by being presented, under the
heading [‘Sponsored links’], either at the top of the page, against
a yellow background, or on the right-hand side. Google’s main
competitors (Microsoft and Yahoo!) operate similar advertising
systems.
Through AdWords, Google allows advertisers to select keywords
so that their ads are displayed to internet users in response to the
entry of those keywords in Google’s search engine. Every time
an internet user subsequently clicks on the ad’s link, Google is
remunerated in accordance with a price agreed beforehand
(‘price per click’). There is no limit to the number of advertisers
that can select a keyword, and if all the ads relating to that
keyword cannot be displayed at the same time they will be
ranked according to the price per click and by the number of
times that internet users have previously clicked on the ad’s link.
Google has set up an automated process for the selection of
keywords and the creation of ads: advertisers type in the
keywords, draft the commercial message, and input the link to
their site. As part of this automated process, Google provides
optional information on the number of searches on its search
engine featuring the selected keywords, as well as related
keywords, and the corresponding number of advertisers.
Advertisers can then narrow down their selection of keywords in
60
order to maximize the exposure of their ads.
Although Google provides a ‘Trademark Complaint Procedure”
under which it investigates trademark complaints regarding the
sponsored links, Google does not offer services akin to eBay’s noticeand-takedown regime. Instead, Google encourages trademark owners
to contact the individual advertiser that, according to Google’s
AdWords and AdSense Trademark Policy, is responsible for the
keywords selected. Google does not have a complaint procedure for

60. Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 9–12 (paragraph numbers and
footnotes omitted). However, due to litigation Google has changed its policy for some
countries.; Google, Inc., AdWords Trademark Complaint Procedure, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/intl/en/tm_complaint_AdWords/complaint.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2010).
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III. LEGISLATIVE BASIS
A. The E-Commerce Directive
The European Union adopted a horizontal approach and regulated
the issue of liability of ISPs from the perspective of e-commerce as
62
opposed to that of infringement of a specific right. As a consequence,
the E-Commerce Directive applies to all types of illegal activity. The
Directive provides safe harbors for mere conduit, caching, and hosting
under the following circumstances:
Article 12: “Mere conduit”
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists
of the transmission in a communication network of information
provided by a recipient of the service, or the provision of access
to a communication network, Member States shall ensure that
the service provider is not liable for the information transmitted,
on condition that the provider:
(a) does not initiate the transmission;
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the
transmission.
2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to
in paragraph 1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient
storage of the information transmitted in so far as this takes place
for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the
communication network, and provided that the information is
not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for
63
the transmission.
Article 13: “Caching”
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists
of the transmission in a communication network of information
61. Google, Inc., What is Google’s AdWords and AdSense trademark policy?,
GOOGLE, http://AdWords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6118 (last
visited Nov 5, 2011).
62. The text is, nevertheless, strongly influenced by copyright concerns that were at
the forefront at the time of adoption of the E-commerce Directive.
63. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 12(1)–(2) (emphasis added). “This
Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent
an infringement.” Id. at art. 12(3).
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provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall
ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic,
intermediate and temporary storage of that information,
performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the
information’s onward transmission to other recipients of the
service upon their request, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not modify the information;
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the
information;
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of
the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and
used by industry;
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of
technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain
data on the use of the information; and
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access
to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge
of the fact that the information at the initial source of the
transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it
has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority
64
has ordered such removal or disablement.
Article 14: “Hosting”
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists
of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the
service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is
not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient
of the service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or
information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the
information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is
65
acting under the authority or the control of the provider . . . .

64. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 13(1) (emphasis added). “This Article
shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with
Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an
infringement.” Id. at art. 13(2).
65. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 14(1)–(2) (emphasis added). “This
Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance
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Member States were not required to institute or require intermediaries
to put notice-and-takedown procedures in place. Instead, self66
regulation by interested parties was expressly encouraged.
Article 15
No general obligation to monitor
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on
providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13
and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store,
nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances
indicating illegal activity.
2. Member States may establish obligations for information
society service providers promptly to inform the competent
public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or
information provided by recipients of their service or obligations
to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request,
information enabling the identification of recipients of their
67
service with whom they have storage agreements.
Most Member States literally transposed Articles 12–14 into their
national laws. In addition, some Member States provided limitations on
68
The First
liability for providers of hyperlinks and search engines.
Commission Report accepts this development as being in line with the
E-Commerce Directive, and encourages Member States to develop legal
69
security for intermediaries on the internet. The report recognizes,
albeit in reference to activity in Articles 12–14 only, that the general
monitoring of millions of sites and web pages would, in practical terms,
be impossible and would result in disproportionate burdens on
intermediaries and higher costs of access to basic services for users.
with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent
an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing
procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information.” Id. at art. 14(3).
66. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 40, art. 16; see also First
Commission Report, supra note 35, at 74–75. At the time of publication of the report, only
Finland had set out a copyright-specific Notice and Takedown procedure in legislation. All
other Member States had left the issue to self-regulation.
67. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, art. 15(1)–(2) (emphasis added).
68. Spain and Portugal considered hyperlinks and search engines to fall under Article
14. Austria and Liechtenstein placed search engines under Article 12, while hyperlinks were
regulated by Article 14. In addition, Hungary and Poland have extended the protection
granted to hosts in Article 14 to location tool providers. Stephen Ott, Liability of Providers
of Hyperlinks and Location Tools (PHLTs) in EU Member States, LINKS & LAW (Nov. 1,
2006), http://www.linksandlaw.com/news-update44.htm .
69. First Commission Report, supra note 35, at 67, 72.
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There is not yet technology that cannot be circumvented and provide
full effectiveness in blocking or filtering illegal and harmful information
that at the same time avoids blocking entirely legal information. Overprotection by blocking entirely legal information inevitably results in
70
violations of the freedom of expression of other users.
The European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ) gave its Grand
Chamber ruling on March 23, 2010, on the question of whether Article
14 of the E-Commerce Directive covers search engines and hyperlinks
and whether Google’s AdWords service constitutes “hosting” within the
71
meaning of Article 14. Despite unofficial legislative history to the
72
contrary, both the EUCJ and Advocate General Poiares-Maduro
concluded that Google’s AdWords program may be an “information
society service” within the meaning of the E-Commerce Directive. This
decision was reached because the service is provided at a distance, by
means of electronic equipment for the processing and storage of data, at
the individual request of a recipient of services, and normally in return
73
for remuneration. However, the requirement of remuneration in a
strict sense is not typically satisfied by ISPs since these services are
generally provided free of charge. In the instant case, AG PoiaresMaduro solved this conundrum by stating that “the search engine is
provided free of charge in the expectation of remuneration under
74
AdWords.” Although not articulated in the present case, but instead
passed in favor of a flexible interpretation, the definition of an
70. Id. at 73.
71. See Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R.
I-02417.
72. Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 131–35. The Advocate General
noted that the Commission itself had changed its opinion on whether search engines and
hyperlinks were covered by the E-Commerce Directive, since the First Commission Report.
73. Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R.
I-02417, at 110. The Court based its determination on the description of Google’s AdWords
service at paragraph 23 of the judgment: “In addition, Google offers a paid referencing
service called ‘AdWords.’ That service enables any economic operator, by means of the
reservation of one or more keywords, to obtain the placing, in the event of a correspondence
between one or more of those words and that/those entered as a request in the search engine
by an internet user, of an advertising link to its site. That advertising link appears under the
heading ‘sponsored links,’ which is displayed either on the right-hand side of the screen, to
the right of the natural results, or on the upper part of the screen, above the natural results.”
Id. at 23.
74. Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 131.
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“information society service” fits poorly with the business models
employed by ISPs. Additionally, the requirement of the service being
“provided at individual request” seems strained in the increasingly
75
automated setting in which consumers and service providers operate.
Thus, this definition that stems from the directive on providing
information in the field of technical standards is arguably ill-fitted for
76
ISPs.
The court, however, was not satisfied with Google’s service falling
within the definition of “information society service.” Indeed, to avail
itself of the safe harbor in Article 14, the service provider’s conduct
must be limited to that of an information society service, that is, the
activity is of a mere technical, automatic, and passive nature, which
implies lack of both knowledge and control over the information
77
transmitted or stored. The role played by the service provider must be
78
neutral.
Neutrality is impaired neither by the mere fact that the
referencing service is subject to payment, nor that the service provider
79
sets the payment terms or provides general information to its clients.
Likewise, the identity of the keyword and the search term selected by
consumers does not in itself mean that the service provider has
knowledge of, or control over, the data entered into its system and
80
stored in the memory of its server. Instead, the role played by the
service provider in drafting the commercial message, or in the selection
81
of the key word, is relevant when determining neutrality. Based on
these considerations the national court must determine whether the
75. Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde, Online Intermediaries and Liability for
Copyright
Infringement,
at
6-7,
WIPO
(2005),
http://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/1842/2305/1/wipo-onlineintermediaries.pdf;
see also
Lilian Edwards, The Fall and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online, LAW AND THE INTERNET
62-63 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 3d ed. 2009).
76. In order to qualify as an “information society service” the service must be
provided at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing and storage of
data, at the individual request of a recipient of services, and normally in return for
remuneration. Parliament and Council Directive 98/48/EC of 20 July 1998 amending
Directive 98/34/EC Article 1(2) laying down a procedure for the provision of information in
the field of technical standards and regulations; see also Opinion of the Advocate General in
Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 46–53 (discussing the complex policy issues at hand).
77. Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R.
I-02417 at 112–13 (citing Recital 42 of the E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16).
78. Id. at 114.
79. Id. at 116.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 118.
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terms of service do in fact reflect a neutral information society service.
While the court did consider Google’s activity to be within the realm
of hosting, the AG did not. AG Poiares-Maduro reached this
conclusion after comparing Google’s Adwords program to its
[presumptively neutral] search engine. In determining whether the
service was neutral, AG Poiares-Maduro relied not solely on the
technical neutrality of the service, but the neutrality of Google’s interests
affecting the provision of the service. While Google has no interest in
displaying a specific natural result, Google has an interest in displaying
specific results that optimize the number of clicks on sponsored links.
Because the display of ads stems from Google’s relationship with
advertisers, AdWords is no longer a neutral information vehicle. AG
Poiares-Maduro did not consider the technical features of the AdWords
82
program in determining neutrality. Nevertheless, AG Poiares-Maduro
reached the conclusion that Google, in allowing advertisers to select
specific keywords, did not infringe trademark rights because there were
many legitimate reasons for selecting a registered trademark as a key
83
word.
84
The AG in his opinion in L’Ôreal v. eBay criticized the EUCJ’s
reading of Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. The EUCJ stated:
[I]n order to establish whether the liability of a paid internet
referencing service provider may be limited . . . it is necessary to
examine whether the role played by that service provider is
neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical,
automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control
85
of the data which it stores.
First, it should be mentioned that the AG does not view Articles 12–
14 of the E-Commerce Directive as exceptions to liability for ISPs that
should be interpreted narrowly merely as restatements of existing law
86
without any such intended effect. The AG criticizes importing any
neutrality requirement into Article 14 based on Recital 42, which
82. Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 141–45.
83. Id. at 152.
84. Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 139–51.
85. Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre
National de Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R.
I-02417, at 114.
86. Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 136. Instead
he views them as restatements or clarifications of existing law.
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discusses such a requirement in relation to Articles 12 and 13 as mere
87
conduit and cashing. Instead, the duty to expeditiously remove or
disable access to the information concerned is triggered “upon obtaining
88
actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities.”
Furthermore, the established duty to act is limited by the freedom of
89
expression of others.
While both commercial communications and
proprietary interests of trademark holders are protected by the Charter
of Fundamental Rights, a balance between them must be struck.
Indeed, the proprietary right is limited “in the context of electronic
commerce, [since it] may not take forms that would infringe the rights of
innocent users of an electronic marketplace or leave the alleged
90
infringer without due possibilities of opposition and defen[s]e. ” The
proprietary right is protected by specific means such as a notice-andtakedown procedure, with which the ISP is required to cooperate in
91
order to enjoy freedom from liability.
Thus, actual knowledge or awareness arises when served with a
specific court order or notice that cannot be based on mere suspicion or
92
assumption regarding illegality. Similarly, it would not seem possible
under the general prohibition in Article 15 of the E-commerce Directive
to accept construed knowledge, such as the ISP “should have known” or
93
had “good reasons to suspect” illegality. The AG noted that “actual
knowledge” of future infringements could arise when the same user was
allowed to continue infringing the same mark. However, he noted that
a more general knowledge of any future infringements of the same mark
94
would not amount to the requisite ‘actual knowledge.’
B. European Trademark Law
1. Harmonization in Practice: Trademark-Specific Legislation
Trademark law, although not completely harmonized in the
European Union, is increasingly influenced by centralized decisionmaking both by law and in practice. New and contested issues tend to
87. Id. at 140–42, 146.
88. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 46; Opinion of the Advocate
General in C-324/09, supra note 37, at 142.
89. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 46.
90. Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-324/09, supra note 37, at 158.
91. Id. at 157–58.
92. Id. at 160, 162.
93. Id. at 163.
94. Id. at 162, 167–68.
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proceed from the OHIM by way of appeal to the General Court and the
EUCJ, the rulings of which are considered authoritative statements on
the interpretation of the identical provisions in the Trademark
Directive, which are binding on national registration authorities as
95
96
well. The Trademark Directive is modeled on the traditional premise
that affords an exclusive right to trademarks for the purpose of
distinguishing goods or services in the course of trade. The protection is
three-fold. First, Article 5.1(a) affords protection against the use of
identical mark in relation to identical goods or services. The 10th
Recital of the Trademark Directive states that this protection is
absolute, however, the EUCJ has in some landmark cases interpreted
97
this provision to set forth a rebuttable presumption of infringement.
These cases lie at the outskirts of traditional trademark law, where
absolute rules may lead to results inconsistent with the traditional
98
premise of trademark and EU law. However, in most cases at the core
of trademark law, e.g., in cases of counterfeiting or using a competitors
trademark with only slight alterations, the protection is in fact absolute.
Second, Article 5.1(b) affords protection for identical or similar

95.
In the field of trade mark, the ECJ and the CFI have been busy in handing down a
cornucopia of decisions. This has led to considerable clarification of provisions of
the Trade Mark Directive and Regulation. Indeed, it can be said that there is now a
“bedrock” of case law relating to these provisions which is unlikely to be questioned
or overruled. For institutions who have no stare decisis, this is to be welcomed. The
inconsistency of approach that in the past, characterized the Community court’s
decisions has largely gone.
Guy Tritton Et Al., Intellectual Property in Europe, at viii (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 3d ed.
2008).
96. The Trademark Directive that includes provisions of substantive trademark law
entered into force in 1989 and has since been implemented by old and new Member States.
Council Regulation on the Community Trademark 207/2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (originally EC
40/94) (CTMR) introduced a community-wide trademark right (CTM) in 1994 administered
by the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) in Alicante, Spain. The
CTM that spans the entire European Union co-exists with national rights available in most
Member States. Community-wide protection is only available to registered marks, thus,
unregistered marks are protected under national laws of trademark or unfair competition. In
substance, the Trademark Directive and the CTMR set forth the same provisions. In
addition, the CTMR sets forth numerous procedural rules. Although, not directly and
entirely intended for harmonization of national registration procedures the CTMR has in fact
had a strong harmonizing effect on national registration practice.
97. Case C-17/06, Céline S.A.R.L. v. Céline S.A., 2007 E.C.R. I-07041, ¶ 32.
98. See, e.g., Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R.
I-1027, ¶ 51; Case C-245/02, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Bud•jovický Budvar, národní podnik,
2004 E.C.R. I-10989, ¶ 59; Case C-48/05 Adam Opel AG v. Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I-01017,
¶ 21.
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marks for use on identical or similar goods or services when there exists
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public. The
Trademark Directive broadened the traditional concept of likelihood of
confusion to include a likelihood of association. Thus, a trademark
owner could receive protection although the consumers were not
confused per se, but may be confused in believing that the second user is
connected by sponsorship or affiliation to the trademark owner. A
likelihood of association as such is not, however, enough for a finding of
99
infringement under Article 5.1(b).
Third, Article 5.2 provides that Member States may afford
additional protection for marks with a reputation when an identical or
similar mark is used for dissimilar products provided that such use
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the trademark. The EUCJ has
since confirmed that protection under Article 5.2 is available to marks
with a reputation against uses on identical or similar goods or services as
100
well.
Therefore, an owner of a reputed mark may enjoy almost
absolute protection under Articles 5.1(a) and 5.2, which raises the
question of what uses a trademark owner is entitled to prohibit.
Although discussed at length in legal doctrine, the EUCJ has not
101
102
accepted a “trademark use” concept into European trademark law.
99. Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537.
100. Case C- 487/07, L’oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185, ¶ 35 (referring to
Case C-292/00, Davidoff v. Gofkid, Ltd., 2003 ECR I-389, ¶ 30; Case C-408/01, AdidasSalomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 ECR I-12537, ¶ 18–22; and Case C-102/07,
Adidas AG v. Marca Mode CV ECR I-2439, 37).
101. Each contributor to the discussion seems to have a slightly different take on
trademark use as a theoretical phenomenon. Many look at trademark use in relation to a
specific legal question: what is required to acquire a distinctive character? See, e.g., Arnaud
Folliard-Monguiral, Distinctive Character Acquired through Use: The Law and the Case Law,
in TRADE MARK USE (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005); Anna Carboni, Distinctive
Character Acquired through Use: Establishing the Facts, in TRADE MARK USE (Jeremy
Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005). Drawing the line to functional use, see, e.g., Thomas
Hays, Distinguishing Use versus Functional Use: Three dimensional Marks, in TRADE MARK
USE 93–108 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005); drawing the line to denominative
use, see Neil J. Wilkoff, Third Party Use of Trade Marks, in TRADE MARK USE 111–24
(Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005); Massimo Sterpi, Trade Mark Use and
Denominative Trade Marks, in TRADE MARK USE 125–46 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon
eds., 2005); or looking at trademark use on the internet see Spyros Maniatis, Trade Mark Use
on the Internet, in TRADE MARK USE 263–78 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005).
While chosen scope, labels, juxtapositions, and categorizations differ, the substantive law
recognized as relevant for the discussion on trade mark use covers the two general categories
outlined below. Attempts to theorize on the problems surrounding trade mark use have been
made by tying the concept to the user. See Bojan Pretnar, Use and Non-Use in Trade Mark
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Instead, it refers to the protected functions of a trademark, namely
indicating the [albeit anonymous] origin of goods or services. Recently,
in L’Oreal v. Bellure, the court recognized the investment and
advertising function as protected under the Trademark Directive, which
in effect waters down any filtering effect built into limiting the
103
trademark right by functions.
EU trademark law is tailored to real market commerce, and
struggles with addressing new uses of trademarks, as well as uses of
trademarks on the internet. For example, Article 5.3 of the Trademark
Directive expressly includes the following acts that the trademark owner
is entitled to prohibit:
[O]ffering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking
them for these purposes under th[e protected] sign, or offering or
supplying services thereunder; importing or exporting goods
under th[e protected] sign and using the sign on business papers
and in advertising.
Although clearly within the realm of the trademark owner’s right in
territorially defined real market commerce, these traditionally
104
The
commercial acts are mixed with other acts on the internet.
traditional one-on-one infringement setting in real market trademark
law is increasingly challenged on the internet where there may be one or
millions of traditional infringers, but also intermediaries who, regardless
Law, in TRADE MARK USE 12–27 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005), and from the
perspective of third parties see Jennifer Davies, The Need to Leave Free for Others to Use and
the Trade Mark Common, in TRADE MARK USE 29–45 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds.,
2005), or to the context of acquisition and enforcement of rights as opposed to infringement
analysis see Bojan Pretnar, Use and Non-Use in Trade Mark Law, in TRADE MARK USE 12–
27 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005). Dogan & Lemley look at the historical
emphasis on the concept of trademark use in infringement analysis through the lens of the
distinction between indirect and direct infringement. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley,
Grounding Trademark Law through Trademark Use, 92 IALR 1669 (2007). Graeme B.
Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis discuss the significance of the temporal dimension to the
concept of trademark use in U.S. trademark law. Grame B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis,
Use, Intent to Use and Registration in the USA, in TRADE MARK USE 313–27 (Jeremy Phillips
& Ilanah Simon eds., 2005). Most authors recognize the other dimensions of the concept, but
choose to focus on a certain aspect of it.
102. Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273;
Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537; Case
C-48/05, Adam Opel AG v Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I- 01017.
103. Case C- 487/07, L’oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-05185, ¶ 49-50.
104. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law,
Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research 404–05 (Graeme
Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds., 2008).
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of intent, in fact facilitate direct infringement of trademark rights.
European trademark law entails neither distinction between direct or
indirect infringement, nor a safe harbor for intermediaries. The internet
also blurs the territoriality embedded in trademark law; whose rights
apply to acts on the internet and for what acts can an intermediary be
held accountable? If all trademark owners in the world can bring suit in
national court against acts occurring on the internet, is it not the worst
case scenario recognized by the Commission that the “general
monitoring of millions of sites and web pages would, in practical terms,
be impossible and would result in disproportionate burdens on
105
intermediaries and higher costs of access to basic services for users?”
2. Harmonization in Practice: General Rules That Apply to
Trademarks
Lastly, the Directive on the Enforcement of intellectual property
106
rights (“Enforcement Directive”) applies to trademarks.
Under
Article 2, it does not affect Articles 12–15 of the E-Commerce Directive
and, thus, does not affect the liability of information society services.
Nevertheless, Recital 23 of the Enforcement Directive states that “right
holders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against
an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to
107
infringe the right holder’s industrial property right.”
It is left to national law to determine the conditions and procedures
108
relating to such injunctions.
The Enforcement Directive, while not
limited in application, targets counterfeiting and piracy. In substance,
the Enforcement Directive provides for effective enforcement
measures, such as measures for preserving evidence, the right to
information (including names and addresses of infringers and
distributors), and provisional, precautionary, and corrective measures,
109
as well as injunctions.
110
The EUCJ has, albeit in a copyright setting, ruled on how the
105. First Commission Report, supra note 35, at 73.
106. Enforcement Directive, supra note 16; see also Statement by the Commission
Concerning Article 2 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2005 O.J. (L 94) 37.
107. Enforcement Directive, supra note 16, at Recital 23.
108. Id.
109. Id. at art. 3-11 (requiring Member States to implement the provisions of the
Enforcement Directive by Apr. 29th, 2006).
110. EU copyright law places internet service providers under stricter scrutiny than
does the E-Commerce Directive standing alone. Thus, if this duty is limited in copyright law,
it would logically follow that internet service providers are not under a stricter duty under

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

ISP LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

27

seemingly conflicting provisions of different directives should be
interpreted, and what obligations and rights are set forth. After all, in
the end, the directives leave it to the national laws of the Member States
to strike a fair balance between the fundamental interests at stake.
In Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de
España SAU, the court held that Article 8 of the Enforcement Directive
does not lay down an obligation to communicate personal data in order
to ensure effective protection of copyright in the context of civil
111
proceedings.
However, the court also held that the same provision
does not preclude Member States from imposing an obligation to
disclose to private third parties personal data relating to internet traffic
in order to enable them to bring civil proceedings for copyright
112
infringement.
It is for the national court, when presented with a
justified and proportionate request, to determine whether a right of
113
information is appropriate. In this determination, the national courts,
and national regulators when transposing the directives, are required to
balance the fundamental rights at stake and choose the interpretation of
114
EU legislation that strikes a fair balance between competing interests.
Not only are national courts left to determine whether a request for
information is justified, but they must also determine whether requiring
the disclosure of information is proportionate to the wrong at hand.
Indeed, the EUCJ explained:
As to those directives, their provisions are relatively general,
since they have to be applied to a large number of different
situations which may arise in any of the Member States. They
therefore logically include rules which leave the Member States
with the necessary discretion to define transposition measures
which may be adapted to the various situations possible . . . .
That being so, the Member States must. . .take care to rely on an
interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be
struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the
Community legal order. Further . . . the authorities and courts of
trademark law, which is regulated only on a general level.
111. Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de
España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, at 55.
112. Id. at 54. The ruling was confirmed by order in Case C-557/07, LSG-Gesellschaft
zur
Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten, 2009 E.C.R. I-1227.
113. Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de
España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, at 58.
114. Id. at 68–69.
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the Member States must not only interpret their national law in a
manner consistent with those directives but also make sure that
they do not rely on an interpretation of them which would be in
conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other general
principles of Community law, such as the principle of
115
proportionality. . . .
Therefore, the required balancing exercise is to be completed via
fundamental rights balancing—an act that most judges in the civil law
tradition are arguably ill-equipped to perform absent fairly specific
116
guidelines from the legislator. In this setting, where a general duty is
pitted against a specific provision, the risk of over-protection of right
holders is apparent. Here, the requirement that the request be justified
and proportionate may easily be reduced to scrutiny based on the
content rather than the basis of the request. In my view, the EUCJ, in
Promusicae, requires scrutiny of both whether the request itself is
justified and proportionate, and whether the extent of the request is
justified and proportionate.
C. Summary
While the EU has reached an exceptionally high level of
harmonization of laws in the field of trademark law and protection of
non-registered marks, trade names and good will remain in the
legislative domain of the Member States.
Principles of unfair
competition and questions of civil liability are regulated by national law,
117
and left outside of the purview of the Trademark Directive.
Nevertheless, the protection afforded under Article 5(1) against uses of
an identical mark on identical products, or an identical or similar mark
on identical or similar products, is completely harmonized, and the
118
Member States may not derogate. Similarly, Member States that have

115. Id. at 67–68 (emphasis added) (internal references omitted).
116. Kur, supra note 9, at 170 (arguing that legislative reform is required to find
solutions to the balancing of fundamental interests within trademark law, and thus, to avoid
having to refer to external grounds).
117. Trademark Directive, supra note 17, at Recital 6 ("[T]his directive does not
exclude the application to trade marks of provisions of law of the Member States other than
trade mark law, such as the provisions relating to unfair competition, civil liability or
consumer protection”).
118. See Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Matthew Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I10273, at 43 (citing joined cases Case C-414/99-416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports
Ltd. and Levi Strauss & Co. and Others v. Tesco Stores Ltd. and Others, 2001 E.C.R. I-08691,
at 32).
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implemented Article 5(2) of the Trademark Directive, which affords
extended protection to marks having a reputation, may not derogate
from the interpretation of that provision given by the EUCJ. All
Member States have implemented Article 5(2). Thus, Member States
may not afford protection based solely on a likelihood of association,
119
However,
nor require a likelihood of confusion under Article 5(2).
under Article 5(5) of the Trademark Directive, Member States are free
to grant additional protection for reputed marks, for example under the
120
rules of unfair competition.
The Trademark Directive does not include provisions on secondary
liability or contributory infringement. In the Google AdWords Case,
Advocate General Poiares-Maduro discussed this issue and found that
the concept of contributory infringement is foreign to European
121
trademark law. Traditionally, these concerns are regulated under the
rules on civil liability. Articles 12–15 of the E-Commerce Directive
address the issue of liability for internet service providers, and exempt
certain uses from liability, such as mere conduit, and caching and
hosting, where the internet service provider is passive, lacks actual
knowledge, and is neutral. While the EUCJ did read Article 14 broadly,
and included Google’s AdWords service as potentially falling under its
exemption for hosting, it was left to national courts to decide whether
Google’s activities did indeed constitute those of a neutral information
society service. It was within the national court’s discretion to balance
the competing interests at stake and, ultimately, to strike a fair balance,
if in fact it was presented with a “justified and proportionate” request.
The issue of whether the request is justified and proportionate is
inevitably influenced by the provisions of the Enforcement Directive,
which was not meant to apply to these provisions of the E-Commerce
Directive, but nevertheless allows a trademark owner to demand, and
courts to issue, an injunction against intermediaries.

119. See Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v. Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. I-12537 at 30. See also Case C-102/07, Adidas AG, Adidas Benelux
BV v. Marca Mode CV, C&A Nederland CV, H&M Hennes & Mauritz Netherlands BV, and
Vendex KBB Nederland BV, 2008 E.C.R. I-02439, at 42. Case C-252/07, Intel Corporation
Inc. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., 2008 E.C.R. I-08823, at 41.
120. Kur, supra note 9, at 169.
121. Opinion of Advocate General, supra note 21, at 47–50, 114–19.
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IV. THE CONFLICT IN PRACTICE: THREE APPROACHES
A. Property Rules and Contributory Infringement
122

On June 4, 2008, a French court found eBay directly responsible
for allowing the sale of counterfeit Hermes bags on www.ebay.fr. In a
joint action against eBay and the seller of two counterfeit bags, the
court held that both eBay and the seller “committed acts of
counterfeiting and imitation of French brand names . . . to the detriment
of Hermes International . . . by selling Hermes bags . . . and by failing to
123
act within their powers to prevent reprehensible use of the site.”
The court dismissed eBay’s claim that it was only hosting
information. Instead, it viewed eBay both as a host and a website editor
that controls the page layout and makes profits from the exploitation of
hosted ads. The fact that eBay offers the technical means for classifying
content and makes profit is, however, not enough when the content is
provided by users and not by eBay. Insofar as eBay makes tools
available to vendors to develop sales, present objects, and establishe
rules of operation and architecture of the auction service, it should be
regarded as a publisher of an online communications service (website
editor) that is subject to brokerage. Unlike liability imposed on other
such publishers, the court did not impose strict liability on eBay. It did,
however, remove the exemption from liability when the website is used
124
for illegal purposes (i.e. the sale of counterfeit goods).
The Court
122. Since then, other French courts have rendered similar decisions on the same
grounds. EBay has yet to succeed on any of its appeals. See, e.g., Dior, Kenzo, Givenchy,
Guerlain, LMVH v. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, Jun. 30, 2008; Dior, Kenzo,
Givenchy, Guerlain, LMVH v. eBay, Cour d’Appeal de Paris, Jul. 11, 2008; Louis Vuitton
Malletier v. eBay, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 3éme Chambre, 4éme Section, Feb.
11, 2010. Louis Vuitton and Dior respectively seek 20-million and 17-million Euro in
damages.
123. Hermes International/eBay et autres, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary
court of original jurisdiction] Troyes, civ., Jun. 4, 2008 (Fr.). Translation by AFP: French
Court fines eBay over counterfeit goods, June 4, 2008, available at
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ieVhlM9xNEzcmDtrdw6ToFLtkRAg.
124. Id. The court recognized that a reliable technological tool for finding infringing
content in listings is not available today. Nonetheless, it imposed on eBay the duty to seek,
by all means, sellers that use the trademark in combination with the product number, serial
number, model number, or a certificate of authenticity to identify the object sold. EBay must
also take all measures to notify the buyer and seller that they accept the terms of service,
including the civil and penal consequences for acts of counterfeiting, potential authenticity
checks by right holders and possible transmission of personal data to them. Even though the
seller had assured authenticity of the goods sold to eBay, it had, for failing to assure
compliance by other means, not fulfilled its duty to ensure the absence of improper use of the
site.
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ordered eBay to pay damages of 1,500 Euros per instance of
infringement and to publish the decision for three months on its
homepage and in four journals and magazines of the plaintiff’s choice,
on pain of a daily penalty of 1,500 Euros.
The French courts approach the question as one of direct
infringement, including contributory infringement. This means that
where an underlying act of direct infringement is established, it
125
determines the scope and intensity of the wrong.
The acts of the
infringer and contributor are equally reprehensible, and are, therefore,
equally punished. All measures available to the right holder against a
direct infringer are available against a contributor. While some
limitations are found in determination of what acts constitute
“contributing” to a direct infringement, these considerations do not
affect available measures once it has been determined that they do, in
fact, contribute to the infringement. The fact that counterfeit goods are
sold on the auction site, therefore, determines whether and what
liability arises. Consequently, the trademark owner must prove that
there was a sale of counterfeit goods, and that acts that contributed to
the sale of counterfeit goods took place.
In determining what acts constitute unlawful direct contributory
infringement, the French courts use the safe harbors for internet
intermediaries in French and European law as guidance.
The court assessed whether the claimed infringing acts constituted
hosting, or whether a general duty to monitor was imposed. It was also
noted that uses for illegal purposes are generally exempted from the
prohibition against placing hosts under a general duty to monitor or
actively seek facts. While generally restricted to crimes against
humanity, inciting racial hatred, child pornography, incitement to
violence, and injury to the dignity of the human person, the French
court applies this obligation to put in place targeted surveillance
measures in cases of trademark counterfeiting. Thus, French law places
a duty to actively monitor and seek facts of illegal trademark
126
counterfeiting upon hosts and other internet intermediaries.
While this duty may be fulfilled by imposing technical surveillance
measures, this is not always the case. The ultimate liability of the
intermediary or host is determined by whether the actual sale of

125. See Mark Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 227
(2005) (discussing the origins of contributory infringement in U.S. Patent Law).
126. Hermes International/eBay et autres, Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] [ordinary
court of original jurisdiction] Troyes, civ., June 4, 2008 (Fr.).
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counterfeit products persists. The standard is one of zero tolerance, that
is, no acts attributable to the intermediary may contribute to the sale of
127
counterfeit goods.
B. Liability Rules: Duty to Act
The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof, “BGH”)
has on several occasions held internet auction sites potentially liable for
128
allowing vending of counterfeit goods on their site.
The owner of the trademark ROLEX brought suit against the
German online auctioneer Ricardo and the globally and nationally
active eBay (www.ebay.de) for failing to preemptively block listings
offering counterfeit ROLEX merchandise. In its 2004 ruling, the BGH
129
considered whether the German Teleservices Act, which implemented
the E-Commerce Directive, prevented suit against an internet
auctioneer for allowing vending in counterfeit products. The court
recognized that the hosting safe harbor applies when an intermediary
does not have influence over the text of the infringing listing. However,
the court held that the E-Commerce Directive does not prevent
Member States from imposing further obligations on intermediaries for
dereliction of duty, as long as they do not amount to a general duty to
monitor or actively seek facts indicating infringement. Likewise, the
safe harbor, under the interpretation of the BGH, only prevents
130
injunctive relief, not a claim for damages.
Thus, the safe harbor does not apply to a claim for damages against
intermediaries that fail to act when it is reasonably within their control
131
to prevent infringement.
However, the Enforcement Directive,
127. See id. (determining whether eBay is a host, where the Court views eBay as a
neutral host regarding acts attributable to users content of listings, while services rendered to
sellers for payment are attributable to eBay, and thus can result in liability).
128. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2004, I ZR 304/01,
2004; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04, 2007;
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2008, I ZR 73/05, 2008 (Ger.).
129. The Teledienstgesetz [Teleservices Act], Jul. 22, 1997, BGBL I.S. at 1870,
replaced by the Telemediagesetz [Teleservices Act], February 26, 2007, BGBL I.S at 179, 251
(Ger.). The revised Act does not address this issue. Henning Krieg, Online Intermediaries
May Have an Obligation to Monitor Content Posted by Users, BIRD & BIRD (April 6, 2007),
http://www.twobirds.com/English/News/Articles/Pages/Online_intermediaries_obligation_mo
nitor_user-posted_content.aspx.
130. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04,
2007, at 14 (Ger.).
131. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2007, I ZR 304/01,
2007, at 27–36 (Ger.). It should be noted that this form of liability is not a form of indirect
trademark infringement, since no proof of trademark infringement is required. Instead, the
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according to the BGH, not only allows, but specifically calls for this type
132
of remedy for trademark owners.
For the court, the threshold seems reached when the intermediary
has actual knowledge of past infringements, and it is technically
133
possible, and reasonable, to require it to prevent future infringements.
More specifically, the court targeted filtering out uses of words like
“replica” or “copy” in combination with a well-known trademark. The
burden of showing that reasonable steps have been taken falls on the
134
defendant, that is, the internet intermediary.
The BGH emphasized that the intermediary cannot be under a duty
to act that includes performing acts that are technically impossible, or
135
acts that would endanger its business model. Fault on the part of the
136
intermediary must be present before a claim for damages can succeed.
The BGH indicated that the use of filtering software, and performing
manual checks on the results, are reasonable to ask from the
intermediary. The absence of reliable filtering software does not,
137
however, excuse the failure of the intermediary to act.
The court
dismissed the claim that it was unreasonable that the software would
flag legitimate claims for removal, since a claim for damages would only
138
succeed in respect to a failure to remove infringing content.
On
remand, eBay avoided liability by introducing filtering software that
automatically removes listings that contain the most common
139
expressions used in counterfeit listings.

tort is based on a dereliction of duty. In the view of the BGH, the CTMR allows the German
premise for liability, since it remains silent on the issue of indirect or vicarious liability. Id. at
35.
132. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR 35/04,
2007, at 36, 38 (Ger.).
133. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2007, I ZR 304/04,
2007, at 19–20 (Ger.).
134. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2007, Az. I ZR
73/05, 2007, at 46 (Ger.).
135. The degree of required negligence remains unclear. However, the standard is not
gross negligence. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I ZR
35/04, 2007, at 47 (Ger.).
136. Id. at 47.
137. Id. at 46.
138. Id. The trademark owner’s claim that listings with an offered price lower than
800 Euro would also be automatically filtered was deemed reasonable, and the court
dismissed objections of over-protection of legitimate content on the grounds that no damages
would issue when no violation was present.
139. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court] Feb. 26, 2009, Az:
I-20 U 204/02, 2009 (Ger.).
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The court based its decision on the Störerhaftung-doctrine.
The
term Störerhaftung implies indirect acts, that is omissions, and does not
cover direct acts of interference or violation of property rights. A
willful omission that contributes to—according to set rules on causality
(adequät kausal)—the violation of a property right triggers potential
liability. A duty to act, in the case of internet intermediaries, can be
triggered by a specific notification. The trademark owner can claim
Störerhaftung without proving specific direct infringement or a causal
connection to direct infringement (i.e. indirect infringement). Instead,
the trademark owner must prove that the intermediary has actual
knowledge of past infringements.
While not held liable, the
intermediary is placed under a duty to act, and thus held potentially
liable for similar future infringements.
After the duty has been triggered, and the intermediary thus has
actual knowledge, it is no longer sufficient to remove the specific
infringing listing notified. In fact, this results in a duty to monitor the
141
site for trademark-specific infringements under a threat of damages.
Although the duty itself is general, it is limited by a rule of reason,
which is applied on a case-by-case basis. If the property owner is
obligated to tolerate the omission by law, the Störerhaftung claim is
142
preempted.
This explains why the BGH carefully explained its
140. In German law liability for nuisance covers responsibility for interference by act,
by state, or by fellowship. The nuisance liability is regulated by general rules in the field of
property law, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 1004, and by administrative
law. Without being an infringer or participant, anyone, who in any way, by dereliction of
duty deliberately contributes to (according to rules of causality) the violation of a protected
good, may be enjoined as an interferer with a property right. Author’s translation based on
the following German definition: “Als Störerhaftung bezeichnet man im deutschen Recht die
Verantwortlichkeit eines Störers als Handlungsstörer, Zustandsstörer oder Mitstörer. Die
Störerhaftung ist durch allgemeine Vorschriften im Bereich des Sachenrechts (§ 1004 BGB)
sowie des Verwaltungsrechts geregelt. Nach der Störerhaftung kann derjenige, der – ohne
Täter oder Teilnehmer zu sein – in irgendeiner Weise willentlich und adäquat kausal zur
Verletzung eines geschützten Gutes beiträgt, als Störer für eine Schutzrechtsverletzung auf
Unterlassung
in
Anspruch
genommen
werden.”
Available
at
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/St%C3%B6rerhaftung. (last visited Nov. 5, 2011).
Reference is made to the following provision (not translated) BGB § 1004 Beseitigungs- und
Unterlassungsanspruch
(1) Wird das Eigentum in anderer Weise als durch Entziehung oder Vorenthaltung des
Besitzes beeinträchtigt, so kann der Eigentümer von dem Störer die Beseitigung der
Beeinträchtigung verlangen. Sind weitere Beeinträchtigungen zu besorgen, so kann der
Eigentümer auf Unterlassung klagen. (2) Der Anspruch ist ausgeschlossen, wenn der
Eigentümer zur Duldung verpflichtet ist.
141. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2007, Az. I ZR
73/05, 2007, at 51 (Ger.).
142. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], § 1004(2).
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interpretation of the E-Commerce Directive and other applicable rules
of EU law.
C. Liability Rules and Safe Harbors
In Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., where the plaintiff had brought suit for
direct and indirect trademark infringement, dilution, unfair competition,
and false advertising on the grounds that eBay facilitated and allowed
the sale of counterfeit products on its site www.ebay.com, the plaintiff
argued that although eBay was not responsible for the listing and selling
of counterfeit items, it was on notice. This obligated eBay to investigate
and control the illegal activities of these sellers by (1) refusing to post
any listing offering five or more Tiffany items and (2) immediately
suspending sellers upon being notified by Tiffany of potentially
infringing behavior. The case ultimately boiled down to the question of
who bears the burden of policing the mark, that is, monitoring eBay’s
site for infringing listings. The district court held that this burden rests
on the trademark owner. On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed,
143
although the claim for false advertising was remanded for a new trial.
There is no federal legislation imposing liability for contributory or
vicarious trademark infringement, and neither is there legislation
removing liability of ISPs for trademark infringement. The United
States Supreme Court has, however, recognized a cause of action
against intermediaries who induce others to infringe, or that have
144
continued to supply while aware of specific instances of infringement.
The trademark owner must prove specific instances of infringement, and
that the intermediary continues to supply despite actual knowledge.
The requirement of proving actual knowledge, and specific instances of
infringement, establishes a standard of reasonableness for
intermediaries. Thus, proof of infringing acts, and that these acts
contribute to further infringement, does not suffice. Secondary liability
is determined on a different premise, and the societal interest in
preventing trademark infringement is balanced against other societal
interests, namely access to, and availability of, internet services to
consumers.
In determining what acts are unlawfully contributing to the
phenomenon of trademark counterfeiting, recognized defenses in
trademark law apply. Likewise, it is of importance whether trademarks
are used truthfully or falsely to indicate the availability of authentic
143.
144.

Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
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goods.
Most importantly, however, the legality of the acts of
intermediaries is determined by what could reasonably be required of
them in practice, in light of known technological tools. It is at this point
of the assessment that a balance between the competing interests is
struck, and consumer interests weigh against finding the intermediary
liable.
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
A. Liability for ISPs
1. Intellectual Property Rights and Trademark Protection
According to the Commission report on the application of the
Enforcement Directive:
Injunctions against intermediaries are not intended as a penalty
against them, but are simply based on the fact that such
intermediaries (e.g., Internet service providers) are in certain
cases in the best position to stop or to prevent an infringement
. . . . As far as third parties are concerned, these are only
145
addressed indirectly in [the Information Society Directive and
Enforcement Directive] where Member States are required to
ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a
third party to infringe a copyright or related right. The aim of
the respective provisions of each of those Directives is that
injunctive relief can be granted against the intermediary
irrespective whether there has been a determination of liability
of the intermediary or the third party. Other than these
provisions, third party liability has been left to the legal system of
146
each Member State.

145. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22,
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, O.J. (L 167) 10–19 [hereinafter Information Society Directive].
.
146 Analysis of the Application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the
Member States Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament and the European Social Committee on the Application of
Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, at 16, COM (2010) 1589 final (Dec. 12, 2010).
Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive states: “Member States shall ensure that, where a
judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial
authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation
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The Commission makes clear that interlocutory injunctions must be
available against “intermediaries,” irrespective of fault, when their
services are used to distribute “counterfeit goods,” and that they cannot
rely on “absolute immunity” when “intellectual property rights” are
147
infringed.
Intellectual property rights can be understood to refer to all forms of
intellectual property, e.g., patents, trademarks, designs, copyrights and
related rights, etc. Another possible interpretation, based on a
historical division between types of intellectual property, namely in the
European tradition, is that “intellectual” refers to copyright and related
rights, as opposed to “industrial” property rights (e.g., patents,
148
trademarks, and the like). The Commission’s continued reference to
“intellectual property rights” interchangeably with “copyright and
related rights,” in discussing injunctions against intermediaries, seems to
indicate that it focuses on the narrower definition of intellectual
property rights. On the other hand:
In the area of the sale of counterfeit goods over the Internet,
feedback
received
from
stakeholders
indicates
that
intermediaries (for example online market places such as online
shopping sites) have realized that the presence and the sale of
counterfeit goods via their sites undermines their efforts to be
regarded as a safe place to buy and sell products . . . therefore
[they] have adopted comprehensive policies on the protection of
intellectual property rights . . . . These policies include sanctions
for users which breach the rules, in particular for the repeat
infringers, comprehensive notice and take-down processes and
other tools that allow a timely elimination of illegal offers, the
sharing of information with right holders and reimbursement
schemes for consumers who unintentionally bought counterfeit
goods on their site. All these measures have been applied
without affecting the liability status of the intermediaries and
have significantly contributed towards the elimination of

of the infringement. Where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an injunction
shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view toward
ensuring compliance. Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to
apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to
infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of
Directive 2001/29/EC [European Copyright Directive].” Enforcement Directive, supra note
16.
147. Information Society Directive, supra note 136, at 15.
148. Paris Convention, supra note 4.
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counterfeiting on the Internet; however, problems remain.

The reference to counterfeit goods and online shopping sites could
also be read to include trademark counterfeiting. This reading seems
natural, since copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting are
considered equally reprehensible. Willful trademark counterfeiting, and
copyright piracy on a commercial scale, are both criminally sanctioned
150
in most countries.
However, separate laws govern copyright (and
related rights) and trademark infringement. Copyright piracy is “[t]he
unauthorized copying of copyright materials for commercial purposes
151
and the unauthorized commercial dealing in copied materials.”
Copyright, which is based on the exclusive right of authorization, is thus
completely hijacked. Trademark counterfeiting primarily copies the
underlying product and attempts to pass the counterfeit good off as the
genuine item by using the trademark. Trademark protection, which is
based on the exclusive right to prevent uses of a mark on identical or
similar goods or services, is inherently limited to only certain uses of
marks. While the pirate causes harm, it does not as straightforwardly
hijack the right, or even the market, for legitimate sales. Trademark law
also applies in a context of legitimate concurrent use (including
advertising) by licensees, retailers, second-hand marketers, repair
service providers, parallel importers, and competitors out of which
illegitimate references to trademarks must be technically
152
distinguishable. Unlike copyright law, the market for legitimate use of
149. Analysis of the Application of the Enforcement Directive, supra note 145, at 38.
150. TRIPS, supra note 8, at Article 61. “Members shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied, at least, in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties
applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall
also include the seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of the infringing goods, and of any
materials and implements, the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the
offense. Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other
cases of infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed
willfully and on a commercial scale.” (author’s emphasis).
151. WIPO, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
166 (Kluwer Law Int. 1997).
152. Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). Although the searchers
employed by Tiffany found 19,000 listings per year that were in fact selling counterfeit items,
their searchers also found approximately 5,000 legitimate listings. Unlike operators of
counterfeit listings, legitimate businesses have no need for opening new accounts. Instead
they may operate their entire business under one account. Thus, the number of listings that
included the term “Tiffany” does not necessarily correlate with actual sales of Tiffany
products, nor is indicative of the effect on the market. The fact that Tiffany does not operate
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trademarks is, in large part, not controlled by the trademark owner
under trademark law. In this light, the statements of the Commission,
or general intellectual property legislation, should not unequivocally be
read to apply as such to trademark law.
Are intermediaries potentially subject to injunctions or liability
because they are “in the middle,” or because they “contribute to, or
facilitate, infringement?” It would seem that in the copyright setting, at
least in the view of the Commission, “an intermediary who carries a
third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject matter in
153
a network” is potentially liable per se, irrespective of its actions. The
intermediary can be ordered to prevent repeated infringement,
regardless of previous acts to reduce infringement, or its own direct or
contributory infringement. Liability, or a duty to act, is based on who is
154
in the best position to prevent the harm in question.
Translated into legal and economic terms, it is not a question of
155
entitlements, but merely one of cost allocation.
Coase argues that
because all situations that give rise to harm are reciprocal, maximizing
156
society’s wealth really boils down to avoiding the more serious harm.
Whenever making someone liable promotes an efficient overall
allocation, the defendant’s conduct will be deemed the cause of an
injury. Liability is placed on whoever is the cheapest cost avoider. That
means that when not placing liability on the defendant would not
on the internet, and therefore finds all sales of Tiffany items harmful, does not translate into
what could be considered “harmful” within the meaning of infringing conduct. On the
contrary, the harm of over-protection of trademark owners to legitimate businesses from
closing their listings may be gravely disproportionate and harmful not only to their sales of
trademarked items, but their entire online presence, and sales of other items.
153. Enforcement Directive, supra note 16 (citing and interpreting Recital 59 of the
Information Society Directive, supra note 145, at Recital 59, which states “In the digital
environment, in particular, the services of intermediaries may increasingly be used by third
parties for infringing activities. In many cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring
such infringing activities to an end. Therefore, without prejudice to any other sanctions and
remedies available, right-holders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction
against an intermediary who carries a third party's infringement of a protected work or other
subject-matter in a network. This possibility should be available even where the acts carried
out by the intermediary are exempted under Article 5. The conditions and modalities
relating to such injunctions should be left to the national law of the Member States.”).
154. Analysis of the Application of the Enforcement Directive, supra note 16, at 16.
Safe harbors in place may limit liability when specific requirements are satisfied; however, the
Commission’s view here seems to argue for limitation of these safe harbors.
155. NICOLAS MERCURO & STEVE G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 23 (1997). Allocative efficiency and “social efficiency
requires trading-off resource allocation against distribution of income.” WERNER Z.
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 6 (1988).
156. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
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promote efficiency, placing liability on him promotes efficiency, because
no liability (i.e. no action or compensation) would make society worse
157
off. When taking Coase’s theory of cost allocation to its extreme, it is
argued that parties to a dispute will, regardless of the initial assignment
158
of rights (entitlements), negotiate to the same efficient outcome.
Consequently, allocative efficiency is reached by allowing them to do
159
so. Coase’s theory, however, presumes clearly defined property rights
160
and no transaction costs.
In the context of copyright and related rights, where the market for
copyrighted works is arguably endangered by large-scale commercial
piracy, the theory of cost allocation may, or may not, have weight. In
our scenario, the transaction costs involved in separating infringing from
non-infringing conduct cannot realistically be less than high, which
precludes reliance on Coase’s theory. Indeed, theories on allocative
161
efficiency are grounded in economic theory, but a partial goal of law
and economics is that in all prevailing schools of thought the ultimate
162
goal is social efficiency. Social efficiency is reached by way of striking
a balance between two, often competing, objectives: that of distribution
163
of income and efficient resource allocation.
It is argued here that we have before ourselves a question not easily
resolved, because “the expansion of trademark law has made the
definition of harm insufficiently certain to serve as the basis [defined
164
property right] for defining the outer limits of trademark protection.”
It cannot be assumed that the granted trademark right is specific and

157. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 154, at 67 (citing an example ‘defining’
causation from the perspective of wealth maximization in William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 110
(1983)).
158. Coase, supra note 156, at 5–8. Coase recognizes that the agreement alters the
distribution of income between the parties, but presumes that this is outweighed by the longterm social cost of involving the legal system in the (re)distribution.
159. It is noteworthy here that the Chicago School, as well as Coase’s theory,
presuppose a common law system, which indeed allows and channels “bargaining” efficiently,
and a legislator that is inefficient in comparison. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 155, at
66.
160. Id. at 67–68.
161. Id. at 24. However, the power of rhetoric is weak in practice, since scholarship
focuses almost exclusively on allocative efficiency.
162. Obviously, some schools emphasize social efficiency more than others.
163. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 155, at 67.
164. Graeme Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 99, 101 (2009) (emphasis added). This is true whether you argue for limiting
doctrines, articulated defenses, or fair use provisions in trademark law.
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delimited enough to allow for no-cost bargaining as envisioned by
165
Coase. Coase himself recognizes that when a large number of people
are involved, and related costs are high, government intervention
promotes efficiency and maximizes wealth, because it prevents
166
squandering resources on numerous transactions.
It is argued here that treating the question of liability of
intermediaries for trademark infringement as a simple issue of cost
allocation may not, due to high inherent transaction costs, promote
social or allocative efficiency.
Therefore, we are left to seek other more appropriate means. First,
we begin by trying to discover and define any existing entitlements.
Second, we consider new entitlements. The question of liability for
intermediaries is treated as unchartered territory, surrounded by poorly
defined entitlements, each pressing for recognition and expansion. The
competing entitlements are the trademark owner’s property right and
the intermediary’s freedom to provide services.
2. Protecting Trademarks With Property or Liability Rules
Thus, what does the trademark right, as an entitlement protected by
property rules, entail? What is included in the bundle of rights?
Trademark rights are alienable, that is, they can be freely transferred
(Article 21 of TRIPS), but some aspects of the exclusive right are

165. Coase, supra note 156, at 8, (stating that “[i]t is necessary to know whether the
damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this
initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions or transfer and recombine
them. But the ultimate result (which maximizes the value of production) is independent of
the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost . . . . But it has to be
remembered that the immediate question faced by the courts is not what shall be done by
whom but who has the legal right to do what. It is always possible to modify by transactions
on the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market
transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would lead
to an increase in the value of production . . . Once the costs of carrying out market
transactions are taken into account it is clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be
undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement
is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about . . . In these conditions
the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the
economic system operates . . . equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental
. . . regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem
particularly likely when . . . a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the
costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high . . . Even when it is
possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market transactions, it is obviously
desirable to reduce the need for such transactions and thus reduce the employment of
resources carrying them out." (internal citations omitted)).
166. See id.
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167

inalienable. For example, the entitlement in Article 21 of TRIPS that
prohibits compulsory licensing of trademark rights is inalienable (i.e.,
168
cannot be ‘transferred’) between a willing buyer and seller, and it is
designed to protect the initial entitlement, or even to define the
169
trademark right itself.
To support and protect the initial grant,
additional protection could, in principle, be afforded to new
170
entitlements with liability rules.
However, the above-mentioned inalienability of the core of the
trademark right distinguishes them from other forms of intellectual
171
property rights, namely copyrights and patents. A consequence of this
inherent difference is that the application of liability rules to
entitlements in trademark law, that is, allowing transfer of entitlements
172
based on willingness to pay, becomes problematic. If the exclusive
173
control of the exclusive use of a trademark is inalienable, that is, not
174
permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller, it is hardly

167. See Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines,
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 82
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis ed., 2008) (discussing the effect of unsupervised
licensing of trademarks).
168. This entitlement could be likened to moral rights protection in copyright law
(Berne Convention Article 6bis). Many European countries consider the right inalienable,
that is, a contract transferring moral rights is invalid. It is considered necessary to protect the
entitlement from outside pressure or force, be it from government, contract partners, or third
parties. See also Spyros M. Maniatis, Trademark Rights—A Justification Based on Property, 2
INTELL. PROP. Q. 123, 151–52 (arguing that the threat of compulsory licensing, as well as the
time limit on the right in patent law, can be used as a direct means to reset the equilibrium in
the commons. In trademark law, where these means are not available [because they would
create confusion], Maniatis argues that a use requirement could serve a similar purpose,
creating a powerful incentive to actually apply the mark).
169. TRIPS, supra note 8, at Article 21. ; Calabresi, supra note 28, at 1090.
170. Dogan supra note 12, at 1670 (arguing that the pop-up and keyword cases giving
rise to the trademark use debate involve attempts at allowing trademark holders to “assert a
new and unprecedented form of trademark infringement claims,” and, in effect, impose
“third-party liability under the guise of direct infringement suits”).
171. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 82 (discussing assignment in gross and
naked licensing of trademarks). Note, however, that the search-cost theory legitimizes a
narrower confusion-based trademark right than in force in most countries today.
172. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1106.
173. While trademarks can be freely sold or licensed, a valid trademark requires a
trademark owner to control it. This is because the trademark owner may lose its exclusive
right if it does not control the use of the trademark by licensees. A trademark cannot
distinguish the goods and services of an entity if its use is not coherent and centrally managed.
A mark that loses its distinguishing function is no longer a trademark. This requirement was
added when the prohibition of transferring the trademark separately from the firm was
removed.
174. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1092.
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possible to allow release of the entitlement without destroying the initial
grant.
For example, while trademarks can be freely sold or licensed, a valid
trademark requires ONE trademark owner that controls it. This is
because the trademark owner may lose its exclusive right if it does not
itself use or control the use of the trademark by its subsidiaries or
licensees. A trademark cannot distinguish the goods and services of an
entity if its use is not coherent and centrally managed. A mark that loses
its distinguishing function is no longer a trademark. To protect the core
trademark right (initial entitlement), the requirement of maintained
control was specified with an inalienability rule, to allow the prohibition
of transferring the trademark without the accompanying firm, to be
removed.
This means that an entitlement that allows infringement of a
trademark right (i.e. use without the right holder’s consent), as long as
the infringer pays compensation, is not logically possible. Thus, unlike
patent or copyright law, the choice or remedy of proscribing the use of a
175
valid trademark under a compensatory scheme with a liability rule
cannot be available in trademark law, since it would dilute the
distinguishing function of the trademark, which is at the heart of
trademark protection. While the heart does not enjoy absolute legal
protection, it is the core, without which the construct of trademark
176
rights could not exist.
Thus, an inalienability rule cannot be replaced by a liability rule
without destroying the initial entitlement. Therefore, the issue of
liability of intermediaries for trademark infringement cannot be
resolved by a legislative compromise that takes away some of the
trademark owner’s control of the legitimate exercise of the trademark
right, with or without compensation. Must-carry solutions, or collective
177
licenses for use of the mark, cannot, due to the fundamental construct
175. See Jane Ginsburg, Copyright Control v. Compensation, PEER-TO-PEER FILE
SHARING AND SECONDARY LIABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW 123 (Edward Elgar ed., 2009).
176. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 82 (discussing assignment in gross and
naked licensing of trademarks); see also the case law of the EUCJ on the essential function of
trademarks. Note what the inclusion of protection of the investment and advertising
function, recognized in L’oreal v. Bellure, does bring protection closer to being absolute for
owners of famous marks.
177. A recent inclusion in trademark law allows measuring the compensation to be
paid for infringing use by way of assessing voluntary trademark licensing fees. Analogy to
copyright is apparent. However, trademark owners are obviously willing to assist the court in
assessing the correct amount of compensation they should receive. The court could not,
however, rule that the trademark owner’s right has not been infringed (entitlement protected
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of the right, apply by analogy from copyright law to trademark law. The
exclusive right is either present in its entirety, or not at all. This fact
explains the trademark owner’s “all or nothing” approach on the
internet—they stand to gain an absolute right and to lose an entire right.
3. Protecting ISPs With Property or Liability Rules
ISPs, on the other hand, can, like other market actors, easily be
regulated by liability rules, and be made to answer to a property owner
wronged, when negligent. However, economic efficiency, distributional
equality and dynamic efficiency, the apparent consistency with new
entitlements, and the relative worthiness of them, may require us to
rethink the situation. Liability rules, we know, are often used to protect
entitlements when there is uncertainty regarding which entitlement
178
most efficiently can attain economic efficiency.
Thus, for our
purposes, when it is unsure whether enforcing a property right in a new
setting, that is, granting an additional entitlement, increases allocative
efficiency and distribution of income, a liability rule is to be preferred.
However, when transaction costs are high on both sides, a granted
entitlement that has been proven wrong, that is, does not increase
179
economic efficiency, will not be corrected by the market place.
Therefore, it is better to entitle one actor to be free from a nuisance with a
liability rule, than entitle another to create a nuisance with a liability rule,
since the latter can pay the former for loss of the privilege, were it
efficient, and leave the former to enjoy the privilege in peace, were it
180
Allowing recourse to trademark owners for contributory
not.
infringement or inducement is a question of granting a new entitlement.
Granting ISPs freedom from individual lawsuits is as well. Thus, when
there is a choice between two liability rules, the latter should be
preferred.
If, however, we are certain that optimal allocative efficiency and
distribution of income demands an entitlement that protects ISPs from a
multitude of claims, we should choose a property rule to protect this

by a property rule), but instead it is forced to allow the use, and the owner is merely entitled
to compensation for the use (entitlement protected by a liability rule) of the mark. A
copyright owner’s right includes either a right to prevent use, or to receive compensation,
when use is allowed.
178. Calabresi & Melemand, supra note 29, at 1120.
179. Id.; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 66 (arguing that “trademark law
reflects a continual balancing act that seeks to maximize the informational value of marks
while avoiding their use to suppress competitive information”).
180. Calabresi & Melemand, supra note 29, at 1119.
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181

entitlement. A property rule can be used to protect both private and
public property. In this instance, the entitlement to communal property
(maintaining public access and use of internet auction sites, search
engines, and virtual worlds) can give rise to a communal property right
that takes the form of a safe harbor for ISPs. In instances where liability
rules are relatively cheap to circumvent, and where a large number of
actors thus choose to avail themselves of the possibility to infringe and
pay (or get away with it), we either have chosen the incorrect
entitlement and the market self-corrects to reach economic efficiency,
or, although the initial choice to protect an entitlement is correct, we
have tailored the entitlement poorly, or chosen the wrong rules to
protect it. The latter situation will allow high-jacking of the entitlement
182
by whomever is strongest. In a situation where transaction costs are
high on both sides, the market will entrench the right of the stronger
entity(ies), and will not allow the market forces to readjust and correct
183
the wrong.
In the current market for ISPs, transaction costs are relatively high
in maintaining a lawful practice, including creating and maintaining
technical tools and providing a service that manually filters and removes
infringing listings. Allowing trademark owners, with relatively low
transaction costs, to have the right to sue internet intermediaries for
contributory infringement would raise these costs even more, including
the costs for defending the entitlement not to act in court.
Thus, it is preferable that the law prevents interference with the
entitlement of intermediaries ex ante, as opposed to allowing them
remuneration for interference ex post facto. Exposing ISPs to a
multitude of claims that demand high transaction costs to settle seems
inefficient and disproportionate in relation to the actual loss due to
trademark counterfeiting that the individual trademark owner suffers.
Thus, an entitlement in the form of a safe harbor for ISPs should
prevail. The fact that counterfeiting will likely persist, regardless of
efforts or liability, should also be given weight in the search of an
appropriate rule. Similarly, less onerous alternative means of achieving
the same end should be considered. After all, trademark owners are
free to enforce their property right in alternative ways (against direct
infringers or by utilizing notice-and-take down systems more efficiently)

181. An inalienability rule may even be preferred to prevent actors from selfregulating under right holder pressure.
182. Calabresi & Melemand, supra note 29, at 1090.
183. Id. at 1097; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 167, at 66.

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

46

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

[Vol. 16:1

that may lead to an equally, if not more, efficient overall result.
B. Pooling Resources and Enhancing Cooperation
The approach of the German Federal Supreme Court, Störerhaftung,
seems close to vicarious liability that stems not only from a protected
property right, but society’s response to protecting this right against
mass-infringement. Thus, the property right and the aggravated nature
of the wrong together, give rise to the responsibility of key actors that
control the infrastructure of real or virtual markets. Once the decision
has been made to protect, it is common in property law to place a duty
to act, not necessarily on the party that is at fault, but on the party that
184
is best suited to repair the injury. However, such cases tend to focus
on repairing past wrongs, and not on the prevention of future wrongs.
The German Federal Supreme Court, thus, placed the actor with the
technical capacity to correct the wrong under a duty to act on pain of
damages.
While the German Federal Supreme Court indicated that the
internet auction sites would only be held liable for failing to remove
listings containing replica, copy, imitation, or the like, the duty to act
was left open-ended. The possible deterring effect on the legitimate
acts—removal of legitimate sites, or the proportion of limited resources
channeled to fight counterfeiting—were not enough to remove liability
entirely, since the legitimacy of the initial entitlement “to protect” was
not considered. The suitability of this form of liability in the
contemporary market context, where there is not one trademark owner,
but thousands, not one trademark infringed, but thousands, and not one
infringement, but thousands, can be questioned. It seems at odds with
the principle of proportionality to impose potential liability for failure to
act in this setting, without considering the initial entitlement, or whether
the ultimate goal will be furthered by imposing liability. The long
history of persistent trade in counterfeit goods, regardless of legislative
efforts, seems to prove that there is true uncertainty regarding whether
the measures by ISPs will ever successfully reduce instances of
infringement. Is automatic liability over-kill when similar results may
be achieved with less invasive means?
If the ultimate goal is to reduce harm to property owners, and

184. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1092. After society makes its decision to
protect, it needs to enforce the decision, sometimes by granting new entitlements to protect
the underlying entitlement. This is done without reassessing the value or worth of the initial
entitlement.
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measures reached by imposing some liability on ISPs are somewhat
effective, the entitlement seems proportionate and justified. However,
if imposing more liability on ISPs does not produce a decrease in harm,
it would appear that there is no point in creating a nuisance via
legislation that does not outweigh the social costs of such a nuisance. It
seems disproportionate to have the intermediaries bare the whole risk of
non-enforcement, when it is unlikely that counterfeiting will cease
entirely, regardless of efforts by third parties or property owners.
However, the property owner who suffers direct harm is in the best
position to evaluate putting a proportionate amount of resources
towards the harm it suffers, and is best suited to bear the ultimate risk of
non-enforcement of the property right. One could consider alternative
ways of achieving the ultimate goal, that is, decreasing the sale of
counterfeit goods.
Trademark owners, much like copyright collective societies, could
pool their resources to reach a higher state of economic efficiency. In
Tiffany v. eBay, Tiffany, the trademark owner, had hired two employees
who focused exclusively on searching for infringing listings for the year
preceding the law suit. In that year, the employees found 19,000 listings
that gave rise to concern, and filed notices for claims of infringement to
eBay, who expeditiously removed the infringing listings. While the
trademark owner in this instance chose to discontinue this at least
partially successful attempt at combating trademark counterfeiting, it
shows that a higher level of enforcement is attainable if resources are
allocated to the endeavor. Tiffany’s frustration, although not acceptable
as a ground for shifting the duty to police the mark, is understandable
because the sale of counterfeit merchandise persisted regardless of its
185
effort.
If trademark owners, even only the brands most harmed by
trademark counterfeiting, were to pool their resources together and hire
employees to create and improve filtering software, to manually sort
185. On the policy issue of where to place the enforcement burden, Professor Jane
Ginsburg has argued that monitoring sites for infringing listings can be unduly burdensome
for the individual copyright owner and, therefore, the enforcement burden then shifts to
internet service providers, especially in instances of recurring infringement despite notices
and takedowns. The argument seems to presuppose technological development in the area of
filtering software, and is presented in the context of user-generated content. Jane Ginsburg,
Separating the Sony Sheep From the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of
Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs 29–30 (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Theory
Working Paper Group, Working Paper No. 08-166, 2008). Although the notion of the
“individual” can be debated in the copyright context, it must clearly be rejected in the
trademark context, since trademarks are part of doing business. Shifting the inherent risk in
doing business from one entity to another requires more than mere inefficiency or lack of
resources on the part of the property owner.
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through flagged listings, and to cooperate with ISPs, a higher level of
enforcement should ultimately follow. ISPs have already shown that
such action has a positive effect in combating counterfeiting.
Internet auction houses have also seemed quite willing to share their
experience and knowledge in developing better filtering tools. Pressure
to do more than what is reasonable will likely increase self-protective
186
measures, and decrease voluntary cooperation.
Since the ultimate
duty to police the mark lies with the trademark owner, it should be in
every brand owner’s interest to cooperate, and also to utilize resources
to develop better technology. This is vital for further development,
since there are other ISPs (e.g., Second Life) that need be wooed into
cooperation in the future. Not only are there many smaller actors that
cannot afford efforts like those of eBay, but there are also new forms of
intermediaries and new forms of infringement occurring on the internet
all the time. Trademark owners could incentivize adoption of filtering
software and infringement policies by commissioning the creation of, or
purchasing, filtering software, and distributing it, and updates, to
intermediaries for free. Remuneration would be received by a decrease
in counterfeiting on the site of a cooperating internet intermediary.
Trademark owners, in establishing the pooling organization, are best
equipped to measure the appropriate level of enforcement, and thus, the
amount of allocated resources to correct the wrong or harm they suffer.
Such an organization would likely gather the most interested actors, that
is, those who suffer most from trademark counterfeiting. The success in
combating trademark counterfeiting, especially long-term, would likely
be greater than imposing liability on a primarily disinterested party.
Tailoring the agency to the demands of the internet, that is, adopting a
global focus and a conciliatory approach to intermediaries, will likely
reduce litigation costs on a global scale.
While legal enforcement against organized crime and the sale of
counterfeit merchandise will remain important, the proposed agency
187
could soften the public image of the “all or nothing” approach by
informing, aiding, and providing tools to intermediaries, in order to

186. Unlike eBay that chose the path of cooperation, other internet service providers,
no doubt informed by eBay’s constant pressure from right holders and battles in court, have
chosen the path of tailoring their policies so as not to involve themselves at all as
intermediaries. See, e.g., infra section II.C discussing Google and Linden Labs.
187. By the “all-or-nothing” approach, I refer to advertising campaigns targeting
consumers with threatening messages, such as the consequences of buying counterfeit
merchandise or the possibility of law suits against intermediaries for willful trademark
infringement.

WECKSTROM- FORMATTED-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

11/15/2011 11:08 AM

ISP LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

49

preemptively combat organized crime.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is true that ISPs, or intermediaries, are not what they were at the
wake of the millennium—up-starting businesses at the frontier of
societal and technological revolution. The generation of ISPs that have
benefited from legislative safe harbors are today extremely successful,
powerful, and wealthy enterprises. However, wealth and success alone
188
are not grounds for increasing liability.
At the same time, those
businesses that attempted to profit from infringement of the rights of
189
190
others are bankrupt or struggling today. Thus, fears of mass191
infringers on the loose, because of ISP immunity, are groundless. The
issue of ISP liability is not one of intent, since those who intentionally
attempt to infringe or profit from infringement by others are held liable
across the globe.
In the trademark context, the question today is one of enforcement
in combating organized crime, but beneath the surface lies the
fundamental question of exclusive or open use of trademarks on the
internet. So far, extending trademark rights to all uses of a protected
192
trademark on the internet has been squarely rejected.
However,
attempts at preventing offering or advertising using a protected
trademark comes very close to permanently blurring the line between
protecting the distinguishing function of a trademark to allowing
absolute protection of the investment and advertising function of a
trademark. Therefore, it is imperative to tread carefully in this domain,
and to refrain from allowing actions of direct or indirect infringement
against ISPs, absent clear evidence of fault.
As long as the internet service provider supplies an infrastructure
that primarily benefits society and reasonably cooperates with right
holders that present justified and proportionate claims, it should
188. Lemley, supra note 125, at 244.
189. Napster, Inc. closed its site after the Supreme Court found them liable for
copyright infringement.
190. Tingsrätt [TR] [Stockholm District Court], Apr. 17, 2009, at 73, B13301-06
(Swed.). Since the criminal convictions rendered by the District Court of Stockholm, the
owners of Pirate Bay have opened the site off and on without long-term success.
191. Ginsburg, supra note 185, at 25.; E-Commerce Directive, supra note 16, at
Recitals 42, 44.
192. See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102-03, 113 (2d Cir. 2010); See also
Joined cases C-236/08 - 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L, Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton
Malletiere SA (C-236/08), Viaticum SA, Lucetiel S.A.R.L (C-237/08) and Centre National de
Recherché en Relations Humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L (C-238/08), 2010 E.C.R. I-02417.
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presumptively enjoy immunity from individual right holder law suits,
and expanded statutory or case law-based duties of care. We should be
careful to tailor liability rules based on the acts of a few strong ISPs, and
pit them against the interests of trademark holders. Instead, in
fashioning liability rules, we should look to what rules enabled us to
have a thriving market place, and thus, would allow continued growth of
technologically savvy, and primarily infringement neutral, technologies.
All potentially infringing uses of trademarks in ISP domains are not
known to us today. Neither is the impact of the start-up businesses of
193
today and tomorrow.
Rather than focusing solely on the old
generation of ISPs, policy-making should take account of the
marketplace as a whole. The standards for duty of care should also be
194
tailored with small and medium-size businesses in mind. Developing a
culture of sharing and cooperation between right holders and ISPs (e.g.,
filtering software, best practices, etc.) would likely improve the overall
effectiveness in combating the sale of counterfeit merchandise, and
optimize the use of allocated resources.
New tools should be developed within trademark law that
specifically establish the prerequisites for indirect infringement and
narrowly tailor appropriate remedies. This would aid judges in the
difficult task of balancing fundamental interests properly. Until then,
preserving consumer access to services, consumer and business
utilization of technological tools, competition, expressive freedom, and
freedom of enterprise, are weighty interests that outweigh the individual
trademark owner’s interests in combating individual instances of
195
trademark counterfeiting, and new forms of infringement.
Allowing ISPs a presumptively wide safe harbor would not preclude
trademark owners from utilizing alternative means to reach a higher
rate of combating trademark counterfeiting in the online environment,
namely, pooling their resources and establishing a global agency for
utilizing the notice-and-takedown procedures already in place. The
burden of enforcement would then lie with the most interested parties
who are best suited to allocate the appropriate level of resources in
relation to the actual harm caused by trademark counterfeiting.

193. Compare to the situation in the 1990s. Edwards & Waelde, supra note 74, at 7.
194. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1673.
195. First Commission Report, supra note 35, at 19 (citing a consumer study by
DoubleClick Touchpoints: Effective Marketing Sequences in the Interactive Media Age,
March 2003).

